Defence Analysis is the authoritative monthly publication published by Francis Tusa. As a Defence commentator and writer, Francis Tusa has won a solid reputation for his insight and understanding of the complexities that surround Defence issues and military trends. He first came to prominence during his commentaries on ITN television over the Gulf War period. He now appears regularly on Sky television as a Defence commentator.

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February 2002

The first full work day of the year saw a major change in the structure of Belgium's armed forces. And although it obviously has the greatest impact on Belgium itself, it is also a major sign of the times of how, where and when many European countries see their position in defence affairs.

The major change was the ending of the independence of Belgium's air force, which has now become merely a wing of the army. Effectively there will now be a single. unified armed forces command, with all three services controlled operationally by a central body. At the same time, the army will lose all of its armour and artillery, and according to the Belgian MoD, the army will become "specialised in direct fire" and the forces as a whole will, "…..specialise in humanitarian activities."

What one sees in Belgium - and what one could well see elsewhere in some other European countries - is a defence capability that has been so systematically starved of funding that it cannot retain its existing shape and so starts to implode on itself. Below a certain critical level of defence spending it simply becomes impossible to equip and run even a half-decent armed force. Belgium has now fallen beneath this threshold.

A few pointers. It might look as if the idea of a single command is a sound and wise move - similar to the "Purple Command" concept used by the UK, where formations are commanded by whatever service is core to an operation. Thus, all three services have assigned commanders to the Joint Rapid Deployment Force. But this isn't the Belgian position, which resembles the bankrupt notion of a single service introduced by Canada in the early 1990s, and which proved such a disaster. It promised lovely cost savings - but these were at the expense of military capability. So, no real surprise there then.

There are also further doctrinal issues surrounding the Belgian decision. These impact not just on other European countries but also on defence planning elsewhere. The decision to cut all armour and artillery is quite frankly gob smacking. How one can really even conceive of having remotely serious armed forces without these simply beggars belief. This is not a dinosaur's attitude that what was good fifty years ago is essential today. It isn't even that Belgium has found an amazing way of replacing both armoured and artillery capability. Instead, it has been decided that they are not necessary.

So, scratch any idea of Belgium ever getting involved in a serious war - no, let's rephrase that - even any half-serious peace enforcement operations. A weak handful of under-equipped, under-supported motorised riflemen are not going to scare most Balkan or African teenagers, and are not going to be at the top of force structure planners' lists. Belgium at a stroke has become like countries such as Bangladesh - they have the bodies in uniform, but depend on everyone else for deployment and support. But many potential allies would probably be happier working with Bangladesh's armed forces anyway.

If Belgium can do this, then who else? The above table shows which countries are entering the zone where imbalance between money and military size leads almost inevitably to implosion. Spain, arguably, is just about enough above the level - call it $4-billion? - that it is "safe." Oh, and yes, it is raising defence spending! So even with the costs of professionalisation of the forces, Madrid will probably do alright. But of the others? They look sub-scaled and with falling defence budgets, in real terms at least, will possibly have to face similar decisions as Belgium within a few years.

GIVING UP

There is then another key factor: no matter what happened on 11 September, no matter the New World Order uncertainties that existed before 11 September, for most European countries there is simply no military threat which requires spending, and there isn't an appreciable one on the horizon. In effect, apart from France, the UK, Italy and Spain, Europe is starting to exit defence. Only those countries that have expanded horizons beyond the narrow confines of Europe have a need for defence - even though wise heads looking at reasonable threat options can see more than a few within geographical and time range of western Europe.

When we may see other European countries opting to become "An armed, occasionally armoured, gendarmerie" remains to be seen. But although Belgium may be the trend leader, here, it is difficult to see why some similarly-sized countries aren't going to come to the same conclusions within a short period of time.

After all, where is the threat to Norway with the Soviet Union gone? What threats is the Netherlands aligned against? Once threat assessments start to refer in the vaguest of terms about operation overseas as part of international operations, the slippery slope has been reached. What this all means for the European Union Defence Identity is all too obvious - as more and more of its members limit their contributions to daylight-only fighters and infantry and medics, the gap between real capability and paper capability becomes even greater.

Content featured in this month's Defence Analysis

• UK Defence and Airlift - THE FIRST CRACK IN SDR
• Tornado GR4 Upgrade Programme – GOT THERE AT LAST?
• Royal Navy S+T Upgrade Programme – CUTS BY STEALTH?
• US Afghanistan Losses – COUNTING THEM ALL OUT…
• A400M Programme (sic) – MEN OR MICE?
• Fighter Competitions – UNFAIR! BOO! SUCKS!
• Royal Navy Notes
• Naval Build Lead Times – TAKING YOUR TIME!
• European Coastguards - WORTHWHILE SPLIT?
• Smart Acquisition Conundrums - CAN IT BE DONE?
• Boeing v Airbus Tankers – SLANTED PLAYING FIELD?
• Industrial Wrangles on Type 45 AAW Cruiser – STILL AT LOGGERHEADS
• Type 45, DDX, F124, Horizon Prices – A GREAT RANGE
• French Defence Export Statistics 2000 - MORE AND MORE DATA
• UK Ethical Foreign Policy – ONCE BITTEN
• Letter From New Zealand
• British Army SA80 A2 Rifle – OK, OR FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED?
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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