US Defence Export Restrictions
Not so fast Mr Bond....

But no. Strangely, a whole plethora of – well, how should one put it? – "problems" hove into view. The State Department stuck its oar in on export licensing, and Defence Analysis hears that there are those in the Pentagon, as well as in the US attack/recce helicopter communities who have also tried to stop, delay, prevent, or price-out integration of Hellfire onto Tiger. The first reaction is one of absolutely no surprise at all. After all, no matter how often Washington DC and various US defence companies say that they wish to ease up export restrictions, come the crunch, and they all revert to type.

The US defence community is the proverbial scorpion which wishes to be carried across a river on the back of a turtle. The turtle objects, saying that the scorpion will sting him. The scorpion points out that if he stings the turtle, the turtle will die and sink, and the scorpion will drown. The turtle agrees to take the scorpion across on that basis – only for the insect to sting him when they are halfway across. "Why did you do that?", says the turtle. "I'm a scorpion – stinging is what I do", says the scorpion as both drown.

Defence Analysis had hoped that the honest drive of sheer greed would see Lockheed Martin happy to work on Hellfire integration on Tiger – another platform, another possible set of customers, etc. But for whatever reason (more money made out of Longbow targeting systems perchance?), LM or competitors have decided to put obstacles in the way.

The Chinese (probably) say that the hostile attention of your enemy does you honour. Thus, Defence Analysis wonders whether the same is true with attack helicopters. In the immediate outcome of the Air 87 decision, Defence Analysis pondered whether Tiger did not actually represent the new paradigm for armed recce helicopters, splitting the market from the lower part of Apache and below. In this case, US hostility to Hellfire's integration onto Tiger might well betoken that the US is worried that Defence Analysis's theory might be true.

If so then Eurocopter can bask for a short while in the warmth of the knowledge that in Tiger it has something that is generally right and popular. Whether it can continue so relaxedly is, of course, open to doubt. In effect, Eurocopter, among others, needs to look at the question of Tiger weaponry, and how it will offer different export packages in the future.

There are ongoing armed helicopter contests elsewhere, and the last thing that Tiger needs is to be kiboshed again by the weapons issue. And in this example are some general lessons for European exporters especially – and in historical terms some very specific lessons.

Think back to another American missile and its possible use on European platforms. Think of the promises that export permission refusals would not be used to block overseas sales – this after several such blocks had been imposed. Anyone remember AMRAAM? There may be some, even in Europe, who wonder whether the European offering – Meteor BVRAAM – will ever enter production. But the Australian Hellfire story ought to provide enough impetus to those efforts to get the programme underway.

Tiger has only a default anti-tank weapon in the shape of HOT3 – for modern weaponry it relies on Hellfire for the foreseeable future. Without an alternative radar-guided missile, Eurofighter Typhoon would be reliant upon AMRAAM. If Washington DC and assorted lobbyists can make mischief over Tiger and US weapons today, couldn't they do the same to Typhoon in the export marketplace tomorrow? This especially if AMRAAM was the only BVR missile option?

US use (and abuse) of its own export regulations provides on one hand a major competitive advantage for its industry but also proves a disadvantage. There will always be some customers who when told "Take it as it is – no choices, no pick-and-mix, what you see is what you get", will shrug their shoulders and accept the restrictions. This applies especially to customers who might not normally be able to afford purchases on their own.

But there are also those, and the group is probably growing, who are less willing to be told the defence equivalent of the Henry Ford dictum, "You can have any colour you like as long as it's black." Countries with a sophisticated knowledge of their defence requirements will rarely find a match to their needs from a single, packaged supplier, and will want to shop around.

This is where the US hard line on what it will sell to whom and on what terms might fall down. And in Australia, Washington has encountered one of those countries that will get more or less bloody-minded if it feel that it is being leant on or patronised. And what Australia does today others may do tomorrow. American firms may have to learn to accept major shares of a number of cakes rather than trying to get each entire cake, and then failing.

• UK Defence Budget - SLICING AWAY
• RAF Nimrod Numbers Cut - SO-CALLED SENSIBLE
• UK Ground Based Air Defence - A WHOLE MASS OF CASH
• Air-to-Air Refuelling - ALWAYS MORE THAN YOU THOUGHT YOU'D NEED!
• Fighter Market Changes - OOPS!
• Swedish Defence Exporting - A PERFECT PACKAGE?
• Air-to-Air Engagements - KEEP AN EYE OUT
• Land Systems Industry - THE BATTLE IS OVER
• French Defence Budget Profile - BITING ELSEWHERE TOO
• Gulf War I and Gulf War II - SAME OLD, SAME OLD
• Funding for Operations - DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, DIFFERENT MATHS
• Equipment Modernisation and Production Numbers - NEVER AN UPWARDS TREND
• European A400M Programme - THE END OF THE BEGINNING OR THE BEGINNING OF THE END
• UK Strategic Defence Review: Next Steps - POWER TO THE LIGHT
• British Army Planning - TOUGH TALKING
• NOTES ABOUT JSF
• Letter from Singapore - SLINGS AND ARROWS
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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