Defence Analysis is the authoritative monthly publication published by Francis Tusa. As a Defence commentator and writer, Francis Tusa has won a solid reputation for his insight and understanding of the complexities that surround Defence issues and military trends. He first came to prominence during his commentaries on ITN television over the Gulf War period. He now appears regularly on Sky television as a Defence commentator.

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May 2002

It was a former Secretary of State for Defence - not yet a late one but one whose departure from office was surely unlamented - who gained himself the dubious distinction as "Nott the Minister of Defence," due to his early 1980s decision to dispose of Britain's three aircraft-carrying "through-deck cruisers." Luckily (?), the Falklands crisis blew up before the decision could be implemented and the ships were retained by the Royal Navy, the South Atlantic war's fortuitous timing becoming the saviour of RN air defence capability.

But it now appears that the lesson that should have been learned in 1982 has gone unheeded. Government, although perhaps not an individual Minister, is again prepared to effectively take the same risk as Mr Nott by withdrawing from service the RN's current Sea Harrier F/A2s, "replacing" the capability by substituting Royal Air Force Harrier GR-9s. So far no good excuse (ahem, reason) is given for this latest decision, which largely equates to selling off the ships themselves.

The crassness of the move to retire the Sea Harriers was underlined by a 10 April Commons exchange between Prime Minister Tony Blair and Opposition leader Iain Duncan Smith, who described it as a "stupid decision." The PM's defence was hardly based on a thought-through logic path but depended more on criticism of previous Conservative administrations' track record of defence spending cuts.

But he ultimately admitted that retirement of the F/A2s was related to "the resources available." Strangely, Mr Blair concluded with a reference to forthcoming increases on defence expenditure. The replies were thus oddly disjointed. It is true that an upgrade to the GR9s may well, not significantly however, provide a limited air defence capability. But fundamentally, the aircraft are not primarily intended for air defence . They are, with due respect, offensive land attack aircraft and even the addition of ASRAAM missiles cannot not render them realistically capable of engaging attackers at ranges that fulfil the fleet protection task.

The GR9s' lack of the F/A2's Blue Vixen fire control radar hardly suits them to air defence. The argument that targeting information can be provided to them via data links from slow-moving surface vessels or AEW variants of Sea King helicopters staggering along at some 10,000 feet at around 100 knots holds little water. Indeed, the only water in this case may well be taken aboard RN ships as it was by South Atlantic task force vessels following Exocet and bomb strikes by fast-moving Argentinean aircraft.

Mr Blair's admission that impending demise of the Sea Harrier force is related to resource availability clearly demonstrates what Defence Analysis has been pointing out for months, namely that the near-future defence budget faces severe stretch unless additional cash - lots of it - is forthcoming. OK, perhaps the subsonic Sea Harrier might be hard put to cope with faster, modern intruders but the lack of a genuine fighter screen for the fleet over six years may well prove a false economy.

COST DIFFERENTIALS? HARDLY!

The ageing Sea Harriers are almost certainly becoming increasingly costly to fly but the same will be equally true of the GR9s, upgrades notwithstanding. This particularly if sortie rates intensify to provide pilot training for additional air defence operations.

It may well be that Ministry of Defence strategists cannot conceive of any forthcoming potential threats needing the attention of sea-based fighters during the period between scrapping the Sea Harriers and entry into service of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. But although it is presently difficult to perceive a parallel to the Falklands crisis of 20 years ago, it's worthwhile recalling that neither the Foreign Office nor MoD foresaw that arriving. Hence Mr Nott's unpreparedness at that juncture. Can anyone with hand on heart truthfully state that we now live in a more stable and peaceful world?

Sure, any aircraft's operating economics are of concern but so too is lack of capability if RN ships are called on to deploy to crisis spots in, say, the Middle East. This especially if formerly reliable allies are, as might well become the case, unwilling to provide host airfields for fleet defence aircraft. To know that the RN has no organic air defence capability is an open invitation to marauders.

It was, after all, the decision to withdraw even the Antarctic patrol ship HMS Endurance that signalled to Argentina that the UK was not prepared to tangle with invaders of its own territory. We do not suggest that the Sea Harriers should continue active operations ad infinitum. But is there not a case for retaining at least some limited Sea Harrier reserve capability, not by scrapping the aircraft but by simply overhauling them, giving them anti-corrosion treatment, inhibiting their engines, and mothballing them for long-term storage?

If it is suggested that they will become too outdated to be effective in the mid-term future then let us remember that many good tunes are played on old fiddles. That 50-year old veteran, the Canberra, is a case in point and is still called on to perform its unique roles over troublesome regions such as Africa and Central Asia. Is the Sea Harrier any less unique?

Maintaining pilot currency on the aircraft should pose no major problems - maintaining a brace of FR/A2s in operational condition would hardly be budget-straining and, in any case, pilots flying the GR9s will still maintain STOVL proficiency. Expertise in use of the Sea Harriers' sensors and weapons could be maintained through simulation. Or would such a policy be too demanding of the joined-up thinking with which today's government credits itself? Is someone now in office prepared to earn a similar sobriquet as "Not the Minister of Defence?"

Content featured in this month's Defence Analysis

• European Budgets - STILL NO ESCAPE
• Gulf War II – The Costs - WHO'S PAYING?
• Eurofighter Typhoon Upgrade Costs - HOW MUCH, AND FROM WHERE?
• EADS Strategy - WORD ASSOCIATION: "LAMBS" AND "SLAUGHTER"
• European Naval Construction - NICE WORK IF YOU GET IT
• Defence Competitions - THINGS NOT TO DO
• UK CV(F) Programme - DO I? DON'T I?
• Introductions Into Service - IT ALL TAKES TIMES
• Eurofighter Typhoon Upgrades - AT DIFFERENT PACES …
• German 2002 Defence Statement - STARTING FROM A VERY LOW BASE
• Italian Defence White Paper 2002 - ALL MOUTH – TROUSERS IN THE POST?
• British Army Equipment Planning - SETTING PRIORITIES
• European A400M Programme - ABOUT TO START?
• Small Businesses and Defence Contracting - NO SLICE OF THE CAKE?
• On-going Fighter Contests - BATTLE LINES DRAWN OUT
• Departure of John Weston - FORWARDING ADDRESS?
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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