Defence Analysis is the authoritative monthly publication published by Francis Tusa. As a Defence commentator and writer, Francis Tusa has won a solid reputation for his insight and understanding of the complexities that surround Defence issues and military trends. He first came to prominence during his commentaries on ITN television over the Gulf War period. He now appears regularly on Sky television as a Defence commentator.

His forte is that he 'tells it as it really is'. Incisive in his approach and sometimes even provocative, Francis Tusa's analytical reports and commentaries are closely studied by decision makers within the Defence community at large. Not one to acquiesce to the 'party line' or necessarily follow the latest trend, he is nonetheless widely respected for his unbiased and critical focus on the facts. Not surprisingly Francis Tusa is much sought after by News Editors on both radio and television.

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July 2002

Developments and inventory modernisation of air-to-air weaponry is seen as one of the growth markets in this decade. Look around Europe for one: Sweden, Norway, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands all have infra-red, dogfight missile requirements which see Raytheon's Aim-9X, MBDA's ASRAAM, and the multinational cooperative IRIS-T competing, with Rafael's Python mixing it around the edges.

There's a good E3-5-billion of business here this decade alone. And on top of this, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden all have some form of commitment to the Meteor BVRAAM programme, although all are also buying stocks of AMRAAM in the interim.

But there are some doctrinal concerns about BVRAAM, ones way above the dirty level of the industrio-political debate that is underway. The very simple question about Meteor BVRAAM is, "Is it really needed?" Heresy, perhaps, in the present pan-European climate to suggest such a thing. After all, surely all the relevant questions to do with capability were addressed during the competition?

QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED

Well, there are still some contestable issues around the field of air-to-air missiles, one's which still crop up in debate. One query over Meteor [shown left] is whether for the vast majority of air combat that will likely be seen over the next couple of decades, a missile with quite this range is needed.

Does anyone really need a missile with an effective combat range of 2-3 times that of AMRAAM? In some engagement scenarios, this range could equate to well over 50km, and possibly as high as 100km.

The "problems" that arise from the range are as follows. Are existing or planned air command and control systems capable of managing an air picture which will double or treble in range, multiplying it by orders of magnitude in volumetric terms? Are there any plans to be able to increase the effectiveness of such systems as the E3D Sentry or the Swedish Erieye to manage the new, massive air picture? Further, how often will Meteor-equipped aircraft ever be able to engage at BVR ranges? Think of some wonderful facts about air-to-air engagements.

One is that out of the 100-plus Syrian aircraft shot down by the Israeli Air Force in the 1982 Bekaa Valley engagement, all but eight or so were shot down by Sidewinders or early-model Python IR dogfight missiles within visual range. And all of the engagements with Aim-7 Sparrow semi-active BVR missiles were fired within visual range in tail chase situations. If there was ever a time when a planner could have drawn a line in the sand (or air) and declared , "Anything on this side, friendly, on the other, baddie", then 1982 was it – yet visual engagements were the norm.

Another example, more recent, was the 1998 shooting down of two Blackhawk helicopters over Kurdistan by USAF F-15s. These were engaged with AMRAAMs – yes, you guessed it – within visual range after a "visual ID". Most of the shoot downs of the limited number of Iraqi pilots who came up to fight during the Gulf War were visual range. And even half of the AMRAAM engagements over the former Yugoslavia were also at short range. So, what chance opening up at 75km with a Meteor-type weapon?

NEW WORLD, NEW PRESSURES

But is it that we are now seeing a sea change in the doctrine of air-to-air combat, and how this impacts on procurement? Looking at the initial procurement figures for Meteor might give some idea of where things lie. At present, there is a firm requirement for a batch of some 850, with an option for another 1000, this for six nations. On estimated production split, this would see the RAF buying only 800 Meteor – in effect, only four per Typhoon. Countries such as France and Germany would be buying less than four rounds per aircraft. Sure, further batches can be bought later, but from this starting position, Meteor initial production figures are lower than for European Sparrow Sky Flash or Mica, let alone AMRAAM.

So is Meteor being bought as a "Silver Bullet" round for the European nations? Is Meteor meant to be kept around in case the worst does happen, and European air crews have to face a world class enemy, equipped with frightening machines such as Su-35s, themselves equipped with ramjet-powered missiles? Rather than the traditional weapons split between short range IR and long range radar being dictated solely by range, is the split now between mission?

Such a split would see IR weapons covering the over-whelming majority of air-to-air tasks during the numerous peace enforcement operations that are likely to be the norm. This would leave in all but the most strange situations the radar guided missiles for high intensity threats. Thus "IR" would now equate with "lower intensity", "radar" for "high".

Of course, there are then some strange exceptions to this rule. The USAF tends to use AMRAAM as the round of choice in practically every engagement situation – the fact that wingtip pylons that were originally intended for Sidewinder launch are now as standard used by AMRAAM shows that the US will probably only use IR at the closest of ranges. And at the same time, the IR-guided Mica defies this doctrinal split.

It will possibly be in the interests of various European air forces to try to adopt some new form of doctrine as and when Meteor manages to go ahead. After all, in these budget-conscious days, it is becoming easier and easier for cash-pressed Treasuries to find reasons to cut programmes. And on the basis of operational analysis, BVR engagements in many predictable scenarios are likely to be unacceptable. How the weapons split and balance between advanced IR and radar weapons is sorted out will be interesting.

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