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August 2002
At the same time, Pentagon procurement chief,
Edward Aldridge, gave an exceptionally upbeat forecast on
JSF, basically predicting that the aircraft will almost
inexorably sweep export markets. So will JSF win such a
bow wave of sales that will make it impossible for any other
aircraft to compete?
Australia's $175-million commitment means that eight
countries have now signed up to the Systems Development
and Demonstration (SDD) phase. The UK is the only
Level One player, promising over $3-billion to this phase,
gaining access to detailed design data, as well as having
guaranteed work on all production aircraft. Italy has
become a $1-billion Level Two participant, while other
countries currently involved are: Netherlands
($800-million), Turkey ($175-million), Denmark
($150-million), Canada ($150-million), and Norway
($125-million), all Level Three players.
What is fascinating is that the only country that has
anything remotely resembling firm commitments from the
US is the UK. As a Level One player, there are written
guarantees about what British aerospace companies will
get from the programme in many areas. Everyone else is
signing up for the right to bid into the programme.
Put nicely, signing up at this level for JSF is similar to
membership of a health club you have to put up quite a
bit of cash before you ever get through the door and, like a
health club, you will probably have monthly fees on top of
that. Put nastily, as a Level Three player it is a bit like
sponsoring a tree every six months or so you will get a
newsletter telling you how much your tree has grown. But
that's about it.
Defence Analysis, among others, has detected the trend
of countries tempering their support for the JSF with
quiet reservation well, quiet for the moment, that is.
Some in the Dutch government, in the Finance Ministry
particularly, say that if promises on JSF workshare are not
met, then they will look elsewhere.
Such a stance might
well be taken to mean that The Hague will review
continuation of its JSF membership each year.
Similar mutterings are heard from Norway, which had previously
been close to selecting the Eurofighter Typhoon. Recalling
that the lower level players have not the slightest idea of
the exact nature of JSF they will be allowed to buy what
level of avionics, what level of stealth and so on such a
stance would make sense.
THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN
But back to the Australian Air 6000 decision in favour of
JSF. First and foremost, this hits Dassault and the Rafale
heavily. Dassault and the rest of "Team France" had
invested much time and effort in Australia in marketing
Rafale. Australia was one of three key target markets for
the French aircraft, the others being South Korea and
Singapore. With South Korea the Rafale's best chance to
date gone to Boeing, Australia's importance increased.
The importance of a
Singaporean order has now risen immeasurably for
Dassault for there are few other near-term likely
customers. Indeed, perhaps some of the few that could be
considered are those to whom Dassault is already active
marketing Mirage 2000 Brazil and India are prime
examples.
These two factors seriously limited Typhoon's chances. But, as with South
Korea, although not winning isn't ideal, seeing Rafale's
failure to win is better. Typhoon Edward Aldridge
notwithstanding still won the Greek and Austrian
assessments. Taking aboard the technical win in Norway,
there is still a chance for a sale there later in the decade.
Time is more on Typhoon's side than on Rafale's.
As
French orders hobble along at low level, Typhoon has
close to 200 orders that can be deemed secure, possibly
even as many as 300. But pressure has to be on the
demonstration of real air-to-surface performance, above
and beyond the simple carriage of LGBs for other aircraft
to designate JDAM drops, Storm Shadow firings and so
on have to be urgent requirements for the four nations,
almost at any cost. Eurofighter has to look at those
countries that will not be allowed to buy JSF at least not
the all-up, sexy, stealthy JSF to build a successful
customer base, and there will be quite a few of these. And
at the same time, it can wait to see whether any JSF
partners will fall off the tree, such as the Netherlands.
JSF still has too many configuration questions hanging
over it for it to be an automatic market achiever. Again to
be nasty, the present sales pitch is like that of a dodgy
market trader who offers punters amazing deals but whose
customers, when they pick up their goods after the
"auction," may not get what they thought they were
buying. .
Australia caused feathers to be ruffled and some
observers to be perplexed by announcing its
participation in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project,
effectively saying that the Air 6000 programme had been
decided.
Dassault had talked of uprated engines and overwing
conformal tanks for Australia, and had looked to the
French government to help fund these. Without the hope
of an Australian order, perhaps these options will slip out
of the French funding race.
And Typhoon? Well, Australia was always a very long
shot for Typhoon. Canberra needed to see much more
actual air-to-surface capability in the aircraft than has
been so far demonstrated before it would take a serious
look at the aircraft. And there is a firm line in Australian
procurement that always sees American equipment as
better than European, regardless.

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