Defence Analysis is the authoritative monthly publication published by Francis Tusa. As a Defence commentator and writer, Francis Tusa has won a solid reputation for his insight and understanding of the complexities that surround Defence issues and military trends. He first came to prominence during his commentaries on ITN television over the Gulf War period. He now appears regularly on Sky television as a Defence commentator.

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October 2002

Ahhh, autumn; the nights draw in, it's chilly outside, and the BBC haven't started their Winter schedule so there's nothing to watch on TV. What better time to snuggle up with a good book? Your correspondent has just finished an excellent work by Colonel Daniel Bolger, "Dragons At War" his account of his 1982 rotation to the National Training Centre (NTC) Fort Irwin, as a company commander with a mechanised battlegroup.

The sole job of the NTC was to prepare US units for war against Soviet Forces in Europe and the Middle East. The Fort Irwin desert location was considered to be particularly useful as a simulation of conditions which the US would face opposing a Soviet thrust into the Saudi oilfields. The NTC OPFOR were widely considered to be highly adept at their sole role of simulating a Soviet Motor Rifle Regiment, using light tank chassis's with a variety of modifications to simulate the T-72, BMP-1 and BRDM that the Americans would expect to face.

During Colonel Bolger's rotation his battlegroup had a record of three wins, three losses, and one draw for the various missions for which they were tasked. It should be born in mind that attrition levels of the group after their three wins were around the 40-60 per cent mark, a serious mauling by anyone's standards. The point to all this is that the US Army accepted that modern war is nasty, brutish and (hopefully) short. Mistakes will be punished in blood and even when you win you should expect to have taken your knocks.

Now contrast this with recent newspaper reports on the Stryker wheeled infantry combat vehicle, and its first desert outing at the NTC. We are told that the Stryker "performed well against a limited but highly motivated opposition." The highly motivated certainly sounds like the NTC OPFOR, but what does "limited" mean? Well for this exercise it meant shaping the battlefield to an extent that many might consider somewhat unlikely under a variety of modern war scenarios. For example, the vehicles were prevented from crossing the line of departure until air strikes had removed all enemy tanks.

Well of course who wouldn't like to go to war under these conditions? However we only have to consider the recent Kosovo campaign with total Allied air supremacy, to see that unless the enemy is generous enough to park his MBT's in the middle of a field with hazard lights flashing and e-mails the grid reference to NATO HQ, that tank plinking in "complex" terrain is difficult. It seems rather handy that one of the main criticisms of levelled at these vehicles, too lightly armoured and armed to take on MBTs, was swept away by a wave of the umpires magic wand.

Back in the 1980s the exercises Colonel Bolger took part in matched roughly equal numbers of vehicles against each other. One particular Stryker mission matched 14 of them against two BMP-2s, two BRDM and half a platoon of infantry. You may be surprised to discover that the objective was seized without loss. What you may find more surprising is that the concept of operations for these vehicles is that they will achieve their objectives through speed and stealth rather than mass and firepower. Well 14 against four sounds suspiciously like mass to Defence Analysis.

Stryker Light Armoured Vehicle III variant equipped with a 105mm gun

We're all very well aware that the Future Combat System concept, for which Stryker is simply a small potential part, has been conceived as a "networked" system. The enemy will have been located, designated, tracked, attacked and re-attacked before the land component has even rolled off the A400M mock-up (sorry). However we're all very well aware that friction dominates war. No amount of airpower is going to be 100 per cent effective.

Even after five weeks' of bombing effort in 1991, US/UK forces were taking on T-72s as they swept through Iraq. Can a Stryker take on a T-72? Can a Stryker survive getting hit by a 125mm round? The answer is clearly no, and of course no one in the US Army would pretend otherwise. However it's highly likely that if the US decides on a Stryker type of platform for the ground part of FCS then it will find itself on a future battlefield with T-72s. Quite frankly, even a T-55 firing APDS has the capability turn Stryker into a twisted hunk of metal.

SO WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT, ALFIE

Wargaming is an opportunity to see how new ideas work out, with the great advantage that nobody gets hurt in the process. With the advantages created by digitised forces, tactics for countering these threats could be developed but only if the US starts from a realistic point. Defence Analysis has to wonder what the point is of holding exercises that are so skewed that they represent nothing at all.

Of late, there have been the reports of a strategic wargame where a clever opposition used the ultimate in asymmetric warfare – using muezzins as communications nodes, using dispatch riders rather than radios, and explosive-packed dhows as anti-ship weapons – to inflict serious damage on a US task force on simulated operations in the Gulf region.

The reports say that wherever possible, OPFOR tactics were ruled out of bounds as being unfair. But isn't that the point of such games? Get whipped, take your beating, and try to learn? No-one learns from always winning, and it defies the maxim, "Train hard, fight easy". This was the whole point of the NTC – that proud units would go to the high desert and get whopped, but would learn.

Doctrinally, the recent Stryker NTC wargames have to be taken as a serious question mark against some of the concepts of light, rapidly deployable forces. If they require such extra support and force protection to achieve anything, then what is their actual utility?

Content featured in this month's Defence Analysis

• Changing Defence Alliances in Europe - THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER
• Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles - GETTING LONGER BY THE DAY
• UK Desert Warfare Procurement - FAIT ACCOMPLI?
• MIDDLE EAST NOTES
• Urban Combat - DON'T RUN TO THE HILLS!
• German Defence Spending Plans - PACKING UP SHOP?
• French Loi de Programmation 2003-08 - THE DASH FOR GROWTH
• Euro Land Systems Industry - WRONG MARKET SLICE?
• QinetiQ Part-Privatisation - LEARNING TO LIVE WITH IT?
• F/A-22 Name Change - WHAT'S IN A NAME?
• US Support Helicopter Procurement - GETTING BIGGER AND BETTER
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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