Defence Analysis is the authoritative monthly publication published by Francis Tusa. As a Defence commentator and writer, Francis Tusa has won a solid reputation for his insight and understanding of the complexities that surround Defence issues and military trends. He first came to prominence during his commentaries on ITN television over the Gulf War period. He now appears regularly on Sky television as a Defence commentator.

His forte is that he 'tells it as it really is'. Incisive in his approach and sometimes even provocative, Francis Tusa's analytical reports and commentaries are closely studied by decision makers within the Defence community at large. Not one to acquiesce to the 'party line' or necessarily follow the latest trend, he is nonetheless widely respected for his unbiased and critical focus on the facts. Not surprisingly Francis Tusa is much sought after by News Editors on both radio and television.

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November 2002

The UK Ministry Of Defence has possibly managed to staunch the bleeding, lance the boil, cut out the cancer (that's enough medical/surgical analogies – Ed.) that has been ongoing throughout the SA80 and SA80 A2 rifle saga. A press conference chaired by Land Forces Commander, General Sir Michael Jackson, ably supported by a number of SO1 staff officers, and some startlingly-quick NCOs, should have put straight the weapon's record. It is now up to SA80's opponents to provide demonstrable data that the weapon does not come up to the mark.

Virtually since it's entry into service in the late 1980s, there have been tales of problems with the weapon's robustness, reliability and hardiness. It was this constant stream of stories that finally forced MoD in 2000 to embark upon the £92-million "A2" modification programme.

But reports from Afghanistan that the Royal Marines had experienced jamming in combat triggered an emergency exercise to (A) find out what was wrong, (B) try to correct any material problems, and (C) restore forceswide confidence in the weapon.

And the truth behind the problems experienced by SA80 A2 users? They lie firmly on the side of cock-up, rather than conspiracy. The key is that, ever since World War I, it has been an absolute article of faith that in desert conditions you do not oil your weapon.

Although there was some evidence with SA80 A1 during the Gulf War that this was not necessarily gospel, the old "truths" held firm. But – oops! – the total opposite is actually true. SA80 A2 needs oil, quite a lot, in desert conditions – although not all over the furniture. Is it too difficult to believe that institutional inertia could have been so strong so as to create this as a problem? Not to Defence Analysis's mind.

At the same time, analysis of the issued cleaning kits revealed that they are not robust enough for the job and need replacement. Because the kits wear down quickly, keeping weapons properly cleaned was difficult. A programme to replace the kits is now underway. It will come as a disappointment to those fans of conspiracy theories that this is the story.

Something as simple as institutional myopia and shoddy cleaning kits does not make for a scoop – but holds a ring of truth for Defence Analysis. A duff cleaning kit is similar to the use of dodgy nails on horses' horse shoes – the lowest common denominator that leads to problems.

BACKBONE OPINIONS

What made the conference, and the findings, even more convincing, was the presence of several NCOs. One from 45 Commando was in Afghanistan when the weapon "failed" and then had been a member of the test team. Another was a para who was in Sierra Leone and had likewise been on the test team.

It is difficult to tell soldiers with such pedigrees and operational backgrounds that the Oman confidence trials were "fixed", "not realistic", or "slanted." That the NCOs were also given free rein during the press conference – against the wishes of some MoD civil servants – was also a masterstroke too.

Would that MoD learns a salutary lesson from this experience. If there is one area where MoD could have done a better job with its SA80 A2 confidence campaign, it is over revealing data gained during the recent Oman tests, where the rifle was put through its paces alongside other weapons.

MoD says that for commercial reasons it cannot name which weapons were tested – although one source has told Defence Analysis that the M16-A2, C7, Sig Sauer, and possibly the Steyr AUG were all tested (the latter is in Omani service). MoD says further that it cannot release "data" from tests not conducted under exacting NATO rules.

However Defence Analysis thinks that this is bovine scatology. Ultimately – NATO rules notwithstanding – if you bury four different weapons types in a foot of sand, leave them there for an hour, dig them up, dust them off, and then see which fires best, just why cannot this data be released? That sounds about as equal a test of a number of weapons as can be achieved. All the MoD will say is that SA80 A2, with its new drill to use oil, worked two to three times better than the next best weapon, believed to have been the M16-A2.

As an aside, General Jackson gleefully told assembled hacks at the conference that the US Army newspaper, Stars and Stripes was awash with stories of how unreliable the M16-A2 has been in Afghanistan. But, as an afterthought, have the problems with SA80 and SA80 A2 been anything other than the problem of 5.56mm ammunition? Remembering that in the Oman trials, every equivalent weapon system jammed frequently. Is there not a case for saying that it is the ammunition that is at the root of the problem here?

This line of questioning goes as follows: the decision to opt for 5.56mm rounds was made so that soldiers could carry more. Although the bullet was designed to have sound damaging characteristics it is known, and has been proven in combat, that 5.56mm has neither the range nor the knock-down power of the old 7.62mm round.

The larger, heavier 7.62mm round had more powder in the cartridge to provide its own characteristics. Now, does this mean that simply because of the "oomph" in a 7.62mm case, the round was able to overcome contaminants such as grit, sand and dust? Was it that the power delivered on firing could rip its way through dust in the breech, in a way that 5.56mm cannot, too feeble is it for the job? Comments would be welcomed…..

Content featured in this month's Defence Analysis

• Royal Navy Future Carrier Programme - COVERING ALL BASES?
• CV(F) – The Industrial Picture - DOWN TO THE WIRE
• New UK Defence Industrial Policy - STILL MISSING TRICKS?
• Heavy Forces Versus Light Forces - BABY AND BATHWATER TIME?
• BAES and the UK Market - THE HATRED
• British Army Future Rapid Effects System - THE MUDDLE BEGINS ALREADY!
• Industrial Considerations and Future Rapid Effects System - LAND SYSTEMS DEATH GRIP AVOIDANCE
• Italian 2003 Defence Budget - TIGHTER, YET TIGHTER – FORGET THE SALAMI SLICER
• French 2003 Defence Budget - A STRANGE BALANCE
• European Naval Fleet Ages - THE FOUNTAIN OF YOUTH
• German Defence Budget - DIFFICULT CHOICE
• A400M Programme - ON SOUNDER GROUND – YET WEAKER?
• Selling To The United Arab Emirates - ALWAYS THE CASE?
• UK Expeditionary Air Doctrine - OUT IN THE BOONDOCKS
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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