UK Defence Industrial Base Issues
Need for Foresight

A written policy for Britain's defence industry – the first overt one for many, many years – was formally introduced late in 2002. As already observed by Defence Analysis, many of the principles outlined out in this document appear to have already been ignored, a symptom, perhaps, of a hangover from the ancien regime. But it might also be a sign that no matter what commands come from the bridge of the ship the defence procurement machine has the inertia of a supertanker – which takes a very long time to stop or manoeuvre. Yet the matter of protecting and nurturing the industrial base is one where there is arguably need for more-than-modest attention.

It should be stated right away that Defence Analysis is not looking to get an easy ride for industry – or a series of "get out of jail free" cards. On the contrary. But it is pretty easy to see that there are still some vexing disconnects between keeping a healthy, competitive defence industry made lean by competition and securing national sources of supply over the long term.

This is the wonderful contradiction that has cropped up as a result of the otherwise eminently praiseworthy reforms of the capability requirements system. In the "old days" procurement and capability planning was done on a ten-year cycle. And much as the tanker takes a long time to turn around or stop, so getting a handle on programmes when technology moved so fast was also difficult – look at the Bowman communications programme for a start.

OUT OF SYNCH

But the capability requirements cycle is now working off a one or two year timeframe. This allows faults to be picked up in a programme and rectified and allows technology insertion as and when advances occur but it has also put planners into a very short term mode. Inherently, it is difficult for someone to be working off as short a planning cycle as one or two years, yet at the same time have to look out to a five or ten-year window. And this is the problem – while the immediate drives of procurement are on short periodic rhythms those for defence industrial policy are on much longer cycles.

To take two examples, one mentioned in other circumstances elsewhere in this edition: MBDA and missile development capabilities, and Agusta Westland. MBDA isn't, at face value at least, doing badly. Think of the orderbook for close to 3000 Storm Shadow/SCALP EG cruise missiles, the backlog for the Type 45/Horizon AAW ships' PAAMS weapon system, and the recently-signed Meteor BVRAAM programme. With annual turnover of slightly more than Euros 2-billion, and a total order backlog of Euros 13-billion, this surely can't be a company in any form of trouble?

But MBDA faces a problem that bedevils many companies, missile manufacturers especially. When new missiles are developed they take almost disproportionately large numbers of engineers, in some respects double the number needed for, say, aircraft. But what happens when that weapons system enters production? Well … hopefully, there are other programmes on which the engineers can be employed.

But look at MBDA. Storm Shadow (shown left, fitted to Eurofighter Typhoon) is in production and there is little development work beyond the early stages of the SCALP Navale programme and some "blue sky" thinking on developments for Storm Shadow for the UK's FOAS programme. PAAMS? The same situation – a bit light on hardcore development work.

The only significant development programme is Meteor but this has to take up the slack of some six other missile systems that have left the development stage and are in production – a tough task. To be fair, this is not something special to MBDA – it is the bane of every missile company, and the need to find R&D programmes is one that occupies the waking hours of every missile company CEO.

And to look at the helicopter situation in the UK: why is there a determination not to order anything, much to the detriment of Agusta Westland? OK, it looks set that the Battlefield Light Utility Helicopters (BLUH) will be modified Lynxes, all remanufactured to the same standard, and all marinised. But the award process is somewhat slow-ish and Agusta Westland's pressing need is more EH101 orders. As noted elsewhere in this edition, the subject of Merlin orders is now enmeshed in some thorny theology about equipment capabilities. But do the people making these decisions think of not just the long-term consequences but the short-to-medium term impact of their decisions?

NOT MY JOB, GUV!

There will still probably be those in the Directorates of Equipment Capability and the Defence Procurement Agency who say that this is nothing to do with them – their jobs are carefully proscribed within provision of the best equipment at the best price, pure and simple, and think no further. But in the wake (that is, in the sense of the pattern of disturbed water left by a ship, not the drinks party to mourn those passed on) of the defence industrial policy document, is this stance any longer defensible?

What is arguably the strangest aspect of the government's view of defence industrial policy is that with the recent CVF programme, the government made sure – in as determined a manner possible – that the issue of shipyard jobs was to the fore. The protection of shipyards in northern England and Scotland was maximised and any bidder paying little attention to this would be stuffed from the word go. So why the drive to protect, preserve and enhance jobs in a relatively unskilled area of employment with seemingly less attention paid to higher tech areas of defence employment? Those concerned with making equipment selections should remember that the long-term future of Smart Acquisition depends on the decisions they make today.

• NATO Problems and European Defence Issues - WHICH WAY TO TURN NOW?
• Eurofighter Typhoon Negotiations - WHY NO PROGRESS?
• Tornado F3 SEAD Conversion - THE GREAET LEAP FORWARD!
• UK Watchkeeper Programme - MOVING AHEAD …?
• Aircraft Carrier Comparisons - PAYING BY THE TONNE?
• UK Nimrod and Astute Order Announcements - THE BEST CHOICE?
• UK Acceptance into Service Issues - IS IT REALLY WORTH IT?
• UK Military-Industrial Relations - WHY THE WHINGEING?
• BAES/MoD Astute SSN and Nimrod MRA4 Negotiations - THE GREAT ESCAPE
• UK Gulf Deployment Issues - COPING WITH THE STRESS
• Alliance Watch
• Joint Strike Fighter Programme - A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS
• Future Integrated Soldier Technology Programme - INTEGRATED WHISPERS
• Letter from Budapest - ALL TRUCKED UP!
• UK Precision Guided Bomb Competition - HORNS OF A PRECISE DILEMMA
• Letter from Delhi - ANOTHER WAIT!
• German Draft 2003 Defence Budget - MUDDY REALITY
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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