US Military Transformation Doctrine: Ripe for Change

"Plus ca change – plus c'est le meme chose," as they say in some places, although these are unlikely to be within US military circles. Why so? Because as far as American planners there are concerned, everything has to change – it just must. It wasn't just Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who set a course for the future.

Even prior to his arrival, force planners were setting their sights extremely high, looking to goals and capabilities way beyond today's. And the problem is that as soon as sights are set, lines drawn in the sand, and careers put on the line, common sense tends to go out of the window. Rational debate about "rights" and "wrongs" disappears – and in certain circumstances, attempts by those to say that the emperor has no clothes are met with frantic cries of "Heretic!" This is evidently the case with Force Transformation in America.

The argument – such as it is – starts and ends with the premise that existing US forces are too heavy, too undeployable, and too inflexible; they have to change to become the very opposite of what they are today. Start, middle, and end – Alpha et Omega. For Defence Analysis, any argument that becomes theological dogma – so that it cannot be questioned at all – can't be good news.

Consider the fact that in the 2003 Defense Budget, there is no money at all for modernisation or improvement of the "Legacy Force." Indeed, if one has already decided that there is no future at all in this element of the force, then why "waste" money? Why not deploy the cash – which even in the USA is not exactly limitless – towards those areas that are seen as the future? If your starting point is that transformation is a self-evident truth which cannot be gainsaid, then fine, everything fits. But especially with the lessons from Iraq – many of them ones which Defence Analysis would say are self-evident! – is this "anti-heavy" stance really justifiable? In all honesty, it cannot be so – but this does not prevent the transformation juggernaut from rolling on regardless.

And there are so many changes that could be done to the "Legacy Forces" to enhance their effectiveness. Mentioned elsewhere in this edition are improvements that could be carried out on both the Abrams and Bradley to increase their flexibility and desirability in the type of combat being seen not only in Iraq, but in other areas too. And the evidence is that "upgrades" and "improvements" that could be undertaken possess major advantages – they would be quite cheap, certainly when compared with the leap of faith of the light force, transformation concept. But then, "cheap" and "simple" do not equate to "sexy" and "desirable."

Also elsewhere in this edition, some of the tactical, lower level, equipment-based "winners" and "losers" are examined in closer detail. But there are other concepts that have arisen out of the Iraq conflict that ought to be seriously scrutinised before any so-called "lessons" are drawn from them, especially, if those "lessons" are those that "prove" the advantages of transformation. How much does the Iraq conflict "prove" that digitisation, as it is being pushed forward, is the only way to go? Does it really provide the killing, cutting edge to forces? The initial "lessons" of the Iraq conflict "claim" that the Coalition forces were able to operate inside the Iraqi decision-making cycle. Well, this isn't so difficult to do accomplish, as the evidence comes to the fore, there wasn't any Iraqi decision-making at all! So how can digitisation be shown to be so amazing?

On a similar basis, as the US Army's lead digitised unit, the 4th Mechanised Infantry Division, didn't even see combat, surely the jury is out still? And can anyone really point to any significant combat difference between the UK armoured forces, the US Marine Corps, and the US Army troops deployed in theatre? In order of digitisation capability, the list runs in the opposite direction to that listed above – but is there any proof that, say, 3rd Mechanised Infantry Division was threefold, eightfold, or a dozen times more capable than 1st (UK) Armoured Division? Defence Analysis doubts that anyone will be ever able to produce such data – but it won't stop many from trying to claim that such is the case!

MORE FEET ON THE GROUND

On a similar basis, the Transformation tenet that more can be achieved by less – that fewer troops need to be deployed to complete a given task – has to be seriously re-examined. Sure, you can give infantry down to section/squad level the communications gear – satellite and UHF – that will allow transmission and reception of data and pictures to practically anywhere in the world, including the cockpit of an F/A-18 or a B-1B so that they can engage newly-emerging targets.

But then, you could shove a broomstick up the soldiers' bottoms, and they could sweep the parade squares at the same time, too. But look at what happens once your lead elements have fought that decisive battle, and have pushed on – who protects your supply routes and rear areas? (A good use for the broomsticks! – Dep. Ed.) How safe are "rear echelon" units? Just ask the US Army about what happened to its rear areas in the wake of the of the 3rd Mechanised Infantry Division's advance.

And when the mission changes from war-fighting to peace-enforcement, peace-keeping, or provision of law and order, can someone explain convincingly how lean-manned, Transformational Forces are able to cope? How does one patrol streets, protect hospitals and schools, maintain protection going against ongoing guerrilla operations, and also repair public utilities with small forces? How much does technology help here?

The US solution seems to be to split forces into two types – "war fighters" and "others". But is such a solution (a) wise, (b) affordable, (c) wasteful? Is it, with the direct evidence of the last days of the Iraq campaign, sensible? Isn't the British Army approach – and, for that matter, the approach of most European armies – of multi-role, multi-skilled troops much the better one? But then, such an approach also tends towards having larger numbers of troops – and that isn't transformational!

NET-CENTRIC OR ECCENTRIC?

The overarching issue here is what others do, be they like Britain, active participants or, like France, countries with military pretensions. The mantra that where the USA goes, everyone else has to follow does not necessarily hold water. Just think of the fact that while the US pursues "Net-Centric Warfare", the UK decides that it will strive to attain "Net-Enabled Capability" – it is realised that what might be sauce for the goose is not suitable for the gander. Will British military thinkers be able to make dispassionate studies of the Iraq conflict, avoiding the rush to judgement that is already being seen in US circles?

Think of one obvious area: the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), which largely "mirrors" the US Army's Future Combat System (FCS). Now, according to the doctrinal zealots, the Iraq campaign proves the need for FCS in every respect. But, as discussed elsewhere in this edition, as this might not be the actual case then what might sounder, calmer, cooler British brains make of the operational analysis? Might they not realise that – as with so many things – the "best" results come from blending forces and capabilities, rather than trying to get a "one-size-fits-all" solution? It is to be hoped for, although with regard to its doctrinal basis, many elements of FRES resemble too much how FCS is worked out. If FRES becomes as unquestionable as FCS seems to be, that cannot be seen as advantageous.

One has to hope that the UK in particular and others in general, manage to make a better fist of the operational analysis of the Iraq conflict. After all, especially in land warfare, there is the possible profound change in direction as the age of armour is declared to be dead and the age of "smart manoeuvre" is declared to have arrived. Whether this decision is accurate and justified still awaits serious analysis. The concern is that there are as many starry-eyed optimists in the UK who will do their best to warp the debate into a slavish following of the US armed forces. What must be borne in mind is whether such a move would either be right for the UK, or whether it is affordable. And what is true for the UK is even more so true for France, and the ultimate truth for smaller players such as Italy, Spain, and Germany.

HORSES FOR COURSES

OK, it is true that one of the worst military sins is to prepare and plan to fight the last war. But isn't it as great a sin to ignore the lessons of previous conflicts, especially when they might be equally as valid, if not even more so? Defence Analysis would say that if proponents of Transformation need to find case studies to prove their side of the argument, then they can legitimately look to Afghanistan, and what was undertaken and achieved there.

Many aspects of high-technology, low-manpower warfare were demonstrated successfully there – many more than in the Iraq conflict. However, even there, some of the older, lower-tech lessons were still evident. Even with all of the sensor technology in the world, trying to surround a mountain area about the size of Wales (any small-ish land area is about the size of Wales, as any large land area is about the size of California or Texas) with less than 10,000 troops, and hoping that no-one would get out undetected was a tad optimistic. Sheer numbers still mattered.

What Defence Analysis warms to with regard to the US Transformation "debate," and the slightly lower-level British version, is that there actually is a debate. The stories and "facts" leaked to various newspapers and magazines already suggest that proponents of "technology first" are already parking tanks on front lawns, trying to get an unmoveable presence regardless of the validity of their viewpoint. In effect, they are hijacking the "debate" before it has taken place.

As pointed out earlier, such a stance might be affordable and sustainable in the US military – and even this must be open to some doubt – but is far less likely to be undertaken in a serious manner by the UK military. So Defence Analysis would ask that the UK forces do not jump feet-first in the wake of their American brethren – but instead take a little time to mull over which direction the road leads, whether it is the right road, and at what speed should the next steps be taken. If a phrase springs to mind to describe the approach that the UK should take, it is "Vive la Difference!"

• Future Carrier Programme - Hitches? - FORCE OF HABIT
• Air Combat Training - WHERE NOW?
• US Munitions Expenditure Rates - SPEED UP THE DELIVERY!
• In Demand Iraq War Equipment - USE IT UP, WEAR IT OUT!
• Iraq Conflict Winners and Losers - SURPRISING LESSONS
• Attack Helicopters - KEEPING ITS BITE
• UK Defence Budget Projections - WILL IT COPE?
• Giat Industries Reorganisation - AND NOW, THE END IS NEAR …
• Joint Strike Fighter - WHAT EVERYONE KNOWS … OR NOT
• Assorted Iraq War Notes
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

REF XQQDA XQQEE XQQAS XQQLD XQQAR