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      Defence Analysis is the authoritative monthly publication published by Francis Tusa. As a Defence commentator and writer, Francis Tusa has won a solid reputation for his insight and understanding of the complexities that surround Defence issues and military trends. He first came to prominence during his commentaries on ITN television over the Gulf War period. He now appears regularly on Sky television as a Defence commentator.

      His forte is that he 'tells it as it really is'. Incisive in his approach and sometimes even provocative, Francis Tusa's analytical reports and commentaries are closely studied by decision makers within the Defence community at large. Not one to acquiesce to the 'party line' or necessarily follow the latest trend, he is nonetheless widely respected for his unbiased and critical focus on the facts. Not surprisingly Francis Tusa is much sought after by News Editors on both radio and television.

      DSD brings you selected articles from Defence Analysis ahead of its monthly publication. To find out more, and how you can order Defence Analysis for a full year's subscription [UK £300; US & ROW $560] - JUST CLICK HERE.

    Post Iraq Campaign - Some Thoughts




      June 2003

      Cobra v Apache - Rethink Time!

      No, Defence Analysis isn't making a series of gratuitous "hits" on the Apache just for fun – far from it. But the Iraqi campaign has brought to light some extremely interesting data and stories about Apache and Cobra aircraft, and how both fared.

      It is difficult to find any UK personnel who have anything other than the highest praise for the US Marine Corps' Cobra attack helicopters. With US Marines attached to the British division, these were a common sight above and around Basra. But there was less exposure to the effect of the Apaches, although large numbers of Longbow Apaches were deployed for the first time in combat. But there are those who saw them operate.

      The Cobras were extensively used as Close Air Support (CAS) assets in the south. One observation made to Defence Analysis describes how they tended to be assigned to an area, and would establish a forward assembly area just behind friendly lines from which they would wait for the call.

      Once tasked, they could move into a firing position within minutes, engage, and then undertake attack assessment, still able to engage should further passes be needed. "They were extremely accurate, and always there when you needed them," one British source told Defence Analysis.

      Another who witnessed the Apaches described things as follows. The Apache was regarded as big and mean enough to go off on its own for raids into Iraqi territory. The key tactic was to surround an enemy formation in a horse-shoe, trying to maximise the effects of the long range Hellfire missile. Once the formation was surrounded, it would be engaged en masse.

      However … So much attention was put on the designated target, that little attention was paid to flanks and rear – this explains why on at least two occasions, gaggles of Apaches were "shot to shit", according to both a US colonel, in events also witnessed by UK observers.

      If you don't look at your flanks and rear, nasty men with RPGs and 23mm cannon can do an awful amount of damage. Oh, and the Apache is such a huge aircraft, it is not very stealthy and gets hit rather easily – compare and contrast with the thin Cobra ….

      When the first major Apache raid in Iraq ended in failure, Defence Analysis wondered why the US seemed to have decided not to opt for all-arms assaults using attack helicopters, armoured aircraft, artillery, mortars, and direct fire weapons – the classic approach. The fact that the USMC seems to still persist in using "old fashioned" tactics has to be then contrasted with its success, and loss rates. All Defence Analysis would say is that any Apache users – Army Air Corps to the fore – need to think very, very carefully about how to use their Apaches.

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      US Army Force Structure - Wasteful Organisation?

      One comment to emerge from US mouths over Iraq – and, come to think about it, during operations in Bosnia and Kosovo – was "We don't do peacekeeping."

      As far as US doctrine is concerned, war fighters don't waste time with prissy, panty-waisted things such as peacekeeping – it detracts from the true mission of combat operations. This is merely one reason why the US Army has these strange "Public Affairs" battalions and units – in effect, these troops undertake the unglamorous military roles and missions.

      But look deeper at the matter: how many different "armies" are there, effectively, within the US Army? Well, there's the ever-popular Special Forces element that at the tip of the spear benefits from extra funding and from possessing its own, tri-Service command. Then there are the light and elite forces such as Airborne forces and Rangers, both of whom can show that they meet "Transformational Requirements."

      Next come those involved in transformational units, such as the medium weight Stryker battalions, also seeing more cash heading their way. But then there are the "Legacy Force" armoured and mechanised units, now experiencing gradual suffocation as their funding stream dwindles. Oh yes, then there are those force elements that might get involved in – yawn – peacekeeping. Doesn't this make five different "types" of army within the US Army?

      Has anyone worked out how much it costs to run such a multi-tiered organisation? What are the extra costs of different training structures, logistics, support, and command chains? Now, it is true that one of the aims of "transformation" is to streamline the Army from its perceived monolithic structure, so that it is more flexible. But surely the experience of Iraq – since Bosnia and Kosovo seem well and truly forgotten – ought to show that unless there is a root and branch change in American views of the wider battlefield, then there will still be wasteful "armies-within-armies".

      Also, what effect does such layering have on morale, recruitment and retention? Is there evidence from the US side that mirrors that of the UK? Here, the problem of two-tiered land forces – Paras and Marines on top, everyone else beneath – is recognised.

      For this reason there was satisfaction "normal" infantry such as Fusiliers and Royal Scots were sent to Iraq, even though there might have been a dominance of maroon and dark green berets. Steps are being taken in the UK to make sure that this trend doesn't get worse, and that all combat units are regarded – a few specialisations aside – are equal. But this is exactly why British (and French, and Italian …) infantry and associated units are much more flexible than their American counterparts.

      Content featured in this month's Defence Analysis

      • A400M Miscellany? WHAT AMALARKY
      • Further A400M Issues - GET OVER IT, AND GET TO IT!
      • European Defence Politics - AXIS OF INCAPABILITY
      • Fighter Programme Cuts - THE HARDEST HITS HAPPEN
      • Typhoon Programme Alterations - WHO BLINKS FIRST?
      • UK and French Force Restructuring - WHICH BITS TO KEEP?
      • European AFV Programmes - AT THE CROSSROADS
      • MBDA Consolidation - NEXT STEPS FORWARD
      • EADS: Business Assessment - TRYING TO SHAPE UP
      • German Defence Budget and Force Restructuring - SORRY: NOT IMPRESSED WITH THIS ONE
      • US Technology Transfer Agreement - THANKS FOR EVERYTHING … NOT!
      • UK Defence Policy - YOU COULDN'T MAKE IT UP!
      • National Audit Office Through-Life Management Report - ANOTHER TANGLED WEB
      • Gulf Defence Market - SAFE AND SAFER
      • DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
      • DEFENCE DIVERSITY

      REF XQQDA XQQAS XQQEE XQQLD XQQAR

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      • For editorial matters, please contact Francis Tusa or Mike Witt by E-Mailing Defence Analysis. Defence Analysis welcomes comments - please E-Mail or call + 44 (0)20 7284 0331 - if you have any issues you wish to raise.

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