DSD Logo

      Defence Analysis is the authoritative monthly publication published by Francis Tusa. As a Defence commentator and writer, Francis Tusa has won a solid reputation for his insight and understanding of the complexities that surround Defence issues and military trends. He first came to prominence during his commentaries on ITN television over the Gulf War period. He now appears regularly on Sky television as a Defence commentator.

      His forte is that he 'tells it as it really is'. Incisive in his approach and sometimes even provocative, Francis Tusa's analytical reports and commentaries are closely studied by decision makers within the Defence community at large. Not one to acquiesce to the 'party line' or necessarily follow the latest trend, he is nonetheless widely respected for his unbiased and critical focus on the facts. Not surprisingly Francis Tusa is much sought after by News Editors on both radio and television.

      DSD brings you selected articles from Defence Analysis ahead of its monthly publication. To find out more, and how you can order Defence Analysis for a full year's subscription [UK £300; US & ROW $560] - JUST CLICK HERE.

    US Marine Corps Iraq After Action Report
    Keeping It Simple, Keeping It Real




      July 2003

      It is of much interest – and the provision of first class service – that the US military chose to write up ASAP, and then distribute as widely as possible what can be termed as "Executive Summaries of After Action Reports". Heaven knows, if one had to wait for the UK military to do the same, we would still be awaiting publication of the Crimean War AARs!

      The idea in the US is that as many people as possible need to see them, at all ranks, so that feedback and comments can be garnered and ideas generated. One of the more interesting is that from 1st US Marine Division (1MARDIV), which provides some excellent insights . Unfortunately, many of these will probably be discarded by those in planning and procurement who will not be that happy to see their favourite theories trashed by the harsh realities of operations. Herewith some trenchant USMC comments about their actions.

      "Rumour spreading was rife in particular over the most secure means the SIPRNET. People were using it as a chat room and making unsubstantiated allegations and claims on this means. Commanders lost faith in the SIPR and chose direct voice comms as the best means. It also created confusion and fear amongst Marines that was unnecessary."

      Aha! Defence Analysis has contended for years that as digitisation is forced into service, so the problems bedevilling civilian digitisation – which is running some 10 -15 years ahead of the military – would start to hit soldiers. And here is the first solid proof – use of military comms as a chat room! UK planners who have been working on Bowman might also like to see that voice comms make more sense than data – a voice can put over real commander's intent.

      "Comd 1 MARDIV commanded the Div via one HUMVEE and two aides who remained with him throughout. One aide kept the batteries in his IRIDIUM up, the other rubbed out red icons on the map. He commanded via the IRIDIUM and the map on the side of the HUMVEE. He was usually no less than 100-200 metres behind the lead Battalion or main effort. He would talk to the Regt Comds on the insecure IRIDIUM using veiled speech only. Nothing else!"

      Where to start with this one? Bravo to Major General Matthis for commanding in the gold, old-fashioned Rommel manner! Who needs a massive staff, tentage, CPs, what have you? There has been a trend post-World War Two for command elements to get larger and larger – might this example hopefully signal the start of a reverse trend? Pretty please? If a general can command a force of 60-75,000 men, several hundred fixed-wing aircraft and the same in rotary assets, from a single wheeled vehicle why do others need a small city to exercise their commands? On a more parochial line, nice to see that it isn't just British forces who end up using commercial comms systems for military purposes!

      "PRR is invaluable and Marines can't see how they will work without it in the future. Some range problems and comms interference in some buildings but not in others. Otherwise great piece of gear."

      Nice advert for Marconi ... mirrored by some US Army comments about their lack of suitable tactical comms.

      "Communications were particularly poor; one Battalion managed to be out of comms for up to 6 hours, VHF was not the answer and did not perform well in this operation."

      Another interesting insight on communications issuesone that ought to add another piece of the jigsaw picture of how one might and should operate in the future. Doesn't digitisation rely on near-perfect, 24-hour a day comms? Has anyone carried out the planning for what happens if this is not the case? Defence Analysis has expressed concern worried that digitisation leads to the death of "mission command", the ability to give basic orders to subordinates, then allowing them to implement them as they see fit. This USMC bullet point shows that this has to be the best way forward.

      "Night time was for driving, not operations. Night vision devices were put to very good use for night driving, however only one night attack was conducted by 3/7."

      Interesting – night vision aids are meant to ensure that operational tempo can be maintained through the 24-hour day, helping keep the enemy on the back foot. Of note, too, are USMC comments that commanders tended to forget that troops needed sleep, and some units were held up due to their soldiers falling asleep on their feet.

      "The planning cycle was way behind the execution being conducted by the forward commanders. Div HQ was still producing lengthy OPLANS and FRAGOs that were too late for the commanders, as they had already stepped off."

      OK, this point might be taken by high priests of digitisation to show that more automation and IT is needed to improve the command and control cycle times. But this might miss the point that by the time that any orders were ready, "they had already stepped off …." In effect, the local commander using his brain and eyes can act and react faster than any decision-making cycle. Is there a problem with digitisation here? the concept is to speed things up in order as to get inside an enemy's decision-making cycle, yet it looks as if it might achieve just the converse?

      There are plenty of other US AARs in the course of publication, and some of the other good ones are also examined in other pages of this edition. It must be hoped that they are not discounted as "just a snapshot from a junior officer."

      Content featured in this month's Defence Analysis

      • Iraq Campaign – More Lessons To Be Learned - CLOSER THAN IT NEEDED TO BE
      • RAF Iraq Campaign Lessons - MIXED MISCELLANY
      • UK Watchkeeper Programme - MIXED MESSAGES FROM THE HILL
      • Digitization and the Soldier - NOT SO FAST!
      • Infantry Lessons From Iraq Campaign - THE REAL FIELD TRIALS
      • UK Precision Guided Bomb Competition - REALLY SMART ACQUISITION?
      • Guided Weapons Market - FIGHTING IN THE MARKETPLACE
      • Defence/Aerospace Show Futures - HOW TO KEEP THINGS GOING
      • BAES Merger Options - WHO? AND WHY NOW?
      • German Defence Budget -SAUSAGE SLICING LOGIC
      • Armoured Vehicle Programme Conference – Assorted Notes - GENTLEMEN – THIS WILL BE A DAMN CLOSE RUN THING!
      • An occasional column of news and Views - SOUTH WEST ONE
      • DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
      • PARIS AIR SHOW NOTES
      • DEFENCE DIVERSITY

      REF XQQDA XQQAS XQQEE XQQLD XQQAR

      • To find out more, and how you can order Defence Analysis for a full year's subscription [UK £300; US & ROW $560] - JUST CLICK HERE TO SUBSCRIBE .

      • For editorial matters, please contact Francis Tusa or Mike Witt by E-Mailing Defence Analysis. Defence Analysis welcomes comments - please E-Mail or call + 44 (0)20 7284 0331 - if you have any issues you wish to raise.

      • Copyright © 1999 - 2002 The Defence Analysis publication is only available to annual subscribers from Defence Analysis, PO Box 29478, London NW1 8GF. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium is prohibited.

      DSD Home Page
      DSD's News IndexDSD welcomes Feature Articles for publication

      editor@defence-data.com

      Delivered to your desk and it's Free!

      DSD is published by Defence Data Ltd

      Copyright(c) 1996 - 2003 Defence Data Ltd. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium is prohibited except as provided in the Conditions of Use.The Defence Data logo is the trademark of Defence Data Ltd. Defence Systems Daily, and DSD, are the trademarks of Defence Data Ltd. By using this Web Site, you agree to all of the Conditions of Use.