



His forte is that he 'tells it as it really is'. Incisive in his approach and sometimes even provocative, Francis Tusa's analytical reports and commentaries are closely studied by decision makers within the Defence community at large. Not one to acquiesce to the 'party line' or necessarily follow the latest trend, he is nonetheless widely respected for his unbiased and critical focus on the facts. Not surprisingly Francis Tusa is much sought after by News Editors on both radio and television.
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The idea in the US is that as many people as possible need to see them, at all ranks, so that feedback and comments can be garnered and ideas generated. One of the more interesting is that from 1st US Marine Division (1MARDIV), which provides some excellent insights . Unfortunately, many of these will probably be discarded by those in planning and procurement who will not be that happy to see their favourite theories trashed by the harsh realities of operations. Herewith some trenchant USMC comments about their actions.
"Rumour spreading was rife in particular over the most secure means the SIPRNET. People were using it as a chat room and making unsubstantiated allegations and claims on this means. Commanders lost faith in the SIPR and chose direct voice comms as the best means. It also created confusion and fear amongst Marines that was unnecessary."
Aha! Defence Analysis has contended for years that as digitisation is forced into service, so the problems bedevilling civilian digitisation – which is running some 10 -15 years ahead of the military – would start to hit soldiers. And here is the first solid proof – use of military comms as a chat room! UK planners who have been working on Bowman might also like to see that voice comms make more sense than data – a voice can put over real commander's intent.
"Comd 1 MARDIV commanded the Div via one
HUMVEE and two aides who remained with him throughout.
One aide kept the batteries in his IRIDIUM up, the other
rubbed out red icons on the map. He commanded via the
IRIDIUM and the map on the side of the HUMVEE. He was
usually no less than 100-200 metres behind the lead Battalion
or main effort. He would talk to the Regt Comds on the
insecure IRIDIUM using veiled speech only. Nothing else!"
Where to start with this one? Bravo to Major General Matthis for commanding in the gold, old-fashioned Rommel manner! Who needs a massive staff, tentage, CPs, what have you? There has been a trend post-World War Two for command elements to get larger and larger – might this example hopefully signal the start of a reverse trend? Pretty please? If a general can command a force of 60-75,000 men, several hundred fixed-wing aircraft and the same in rotary assets, from a single wheeled vehicle why do others need a small city to exercise their commands? On a more parochial line, nice to see that it isn't just British forces who end up using commercial comms systems for military purposes!
"PRR is invaluable and Marines can't see how they will work without it in the future. Some range problems and comms interference in some buildings but not in others. Otherwise great piece of gear."
Nice advert for Marconi ... mirrored by some US Army comments about their lack of suitable tactical comms.
"Communications were particularly poor; one Battalion managed to be out of comms for up to 6 hours, VHF was not the answer and did not perform well in this operation."
Another interesting insight on communications issuesone that ought to add another piece of the jigsaw picture of how one might and should operate in the future. Doesn't digitisation rely on near-perfect, 24-hour a day comms? Has anyone carried out the planning for what happens if this is not the case? Defence Analysis has expressed concern worried that digitisation leads to the death of "mission command", the ability to give basic orders to subordinates, then allowing them to implement them as they see fit. This USMC bullet point shows that this has to be the best way forward.
"Night time was for driving, not operations. Night vision devices were put to very good use for night driving, however only one night attack was conducted by 3/7."
Interesting – night vision aids are meant to ensure that operational tempo can be maintained through the 24-hour day, helping keep the enemy on the back foot. Of note, too, are USMC comments that commanders tended to forget that troops needed sleep, and some units were held up due to their soldiers falling asleep on their feet.
"The planning cycle was way behind the execution being conducted by the forward commanders. Div HQ was still producing lengthy OPLANS and FRAGOs that were too late for the commanders, as they had already stepped off."
OK, this point might be taken by high priests of digitisation to show that more automation and IT is needed to improve the command and control cycle times. But this might miss the point that by the time that any orders were ready, "they had already stepped off …." In effect, the local commander using his brain and eyes can act and react faster than any decision-making cycle. Is there a problem with digitisation here? the concept is to speed things up in order as to get inside an enemy's decision-making cycle, yet it looks as if it might achieve just the converse?
There are plenty of other US AARs in the course of publication, and some of the other good ones are also examined in other pages of this edition. It must be hoped that they are not discounted as "just a snapshot from a junior officer."

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