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The state of play of the French SH problems is well known. Due to budget problems, no free cash is available for procurement of the new NH90 Tactical Transport Helicopters until the end of the present programme law period, in the 2007-08 timeframe. This means that these models will then be delivered in 2011.
This, in turn, means that ageing – in some cases rapidly
ageing – Pumas and Cougars [shown left] will have to be kept flying to
cover the requirement. Euros322-million has been earmarked
for urgent Cougar/Puma upgrade work from 2004 - 2010,
Euros111-million for 24 Cougars, Euros211-million for 45 Pumas.
These upgrades will only touch the whole Cougar fleet, and less than half of the Puma fleet so in effect, owing to unreliability and maintenance problems, nearly half of the French SH fleet will fall out of service between 2004 and 2011.
Overall, SH capability will fall by over half, as retained helicopters await upgrades to improve their availability. An option has been mooted – to pull forward the procurement of the first tranche of 24 helicopters to 2007 at an extra cost of t650-million, something that has been deemed unsupportable without extra-specially voted funds. But no un-European point-scoring here, for the situation is far from healthy in the UK.
The timelines for the Support Amphibious Battlefield Rotorcraft (SBAR) programme have been steadily slipping over the last few years. According to the Defence Procurement Agency website SABR entry – conveniently updated November 2003 – the planned ISD for the SABR capability stands at "nearly next decade," which means any of the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 to Defence Analysis's mind.
The programme envisages up to 70 SH
platforms to complement the 31 Chinooks and the 22 Merlin
HC3s. Not too bad, at face value, when the aircraft to be
replaced are 29 Sea King HC4s and 33 Puma HC1s.
But, as with France, there is concern over the lengthy
timeline for the programme to get underway.
If the ISD of whatever is ordered is, say, 2011, then production would start somewhere around 2007-08, although the 2007 date is actually quite optimistic in some respects.
The concern is what will Agusta Westland do between now and then? OK, there are EH101 Merlin orders for Denmark and Japan but these will be fulfilled by 2005-06, leaving another hole in the production line.
It isn't simply industrial welfare that is at stake. Questions are being asked about whether the Sea King and Puma fleet can actually survive in decent operational shape until early next decade? At present, any statements about the reliability and capability of these aircraft tend to be expressed as hopes as much as anything else, hardly a vote of confidence. Already it is known that the Sea King's "hot and high" capability is far from satisfactory – what will change there?
And as with France, the argument is as much over spending on service life extensions for aircraft when the cash might be better spent on new-build procurement? Luckily, the RAF's Pumas are in better shape than the French aircraft, having undergone major upgrade between 1991-96. But then, they tend to log more flight hours and operational time, so perhaps the costs of an upgrade would be about the same. In which case, where will the £120-150-million for a SLEP come from?
More or Less?
The UK position is probably based on the belief that as a major Chinook operator, the shortfall in SH aircraft capability will be far less than that experienced in France – the newer, better-maintained Chinooks carry at least three times the load of a Cougar. But Defence Analysis estimates that there is a potential drop in UK rotary airlift capability of some 30-40 per cent from 2005 as availability and capability of aircraft falls away.
One might have assumed that amid the talk of defence capabilities within Europe, more attention might have been placed on the area of SH – unless it was taken as all being tickety-boo and A-OK. But this is evidently not the case. Unless SH is re-prioritised in both France and the UK – and in France, at least, cost option studies have been carried out – there might occur situations in which forces can be strategically deployed for operations but would suffer lack of rapid tactical mobility.
The situation is less bad for Eurocopter – it isn't as if there is a shortage of orders for NH90 and the lines are quite full, even if one assumes that the Italian and German offtake figures actually fall from difficult-to-justify levels later in this decade. But the situation for Agusta Westland is slightly dicey.
Dare one say that there is an absolutely compelling case for a significant injection of defence industrial policy here? Is there not a case to find some EH101 Merlin work to keep the line ticking over in the period between 2005-08? Indeed, might there not be a case for a radical approach to funding SABR, namely opting for some form of PFI deal, with some payment up-front by Agusta Westland and rear-loading of reimbursement by MoD?

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