UK White Paper: Logistics Issues
All You Do Is Talk, Talk, Talk …

"To support future expeditionary operations, our focus is increasingly on the development of logistics as an enabling capability: a highly effective agile and networked component that underpins the operational commanders' ability to execute their missions successfully."

As remarked elsewhere in this edition, the Royal Navy is the "winning" service of the new White Paper. But looking at smaller entities, it is – or at least should be – the oft-ignored logisticians who are the true winners. Forget even the hightech push towards net enabled capability (NEC), a major driver of the whole document is the need to place logistics in the forefront of military capability. And in the general sense that this is being driven, it can only be supported by Defence Analysis. The above statement of logistic policy is pretty good – workable at the very worst. But what of the other logistic issues that come out of the White Paper?

• "This requires the rebalancing of the Armed Forces to enable them better to meet the demands of the more likely Small and Medium Scale contingencies and needs to include the enhancement of strategic enablers – communications, logistics and intelligence."

  "More frequent, and often longer and/or smaller operations require particular key enablers within the force structure, including communications, logistics, medical specialists, and intelligence."

Comment: The realisation that there will need to be more logistics units to support more, but smaller, operations is refreshing, to say the least. But where will these come from? Will there be wholesale conversion of heavy artillery units into logistics forces? Will infantry battalions previously based in Northern Ireland be converted en masse? How will they be organised? And at what size?

• "In terms of delivering effect and tempo, the DLO moved similar amounts to that deployed for Operation GRANBY, but did so in half the time."

Comment: The logistic history of Operation TELIC is being re-written on the hoof as we write. Senior Ministry of Defence officials have described logistics during the campaign as, "One of the strongest areas of performance as a whole," while another questioned about reports of shortages described these as "only localized difficulties". This goes against the grain of the National Audit Office's report, also covered in detail in this edition.

• "This at least in part is because of a number of critical 'pinch point' enabling capabilities, including certain logistic support, medical, engineer and other specialists, are not appropriately structured to meet the demands of multiple concurrent operations….In the Army we will rebalance key support elements towards the brigade from the divisional level."

Comment: In many respects, an understanding that combat support and combat service support has to be re-formed as a precursor to reformation of combat arms is a promising sign. The key will be to what extent logistics units are made organic to formations of brigade size. After all, in answer to questions about the nature of the re-roled 19 (Mechanised) Brigade, senior MoD officials told Defence Analysis that it would have, "its own combat service support, C2, and its own logistics," suggesting that it wouldn't have to find logistics from a pool.

And while one thinks about this, to examine the problems experienced in moving ammunition from Kuwait up to the front line just prior to the start of the campaign, a significant shortcoming was the shortage of specialist vehicles. This has been noted before, not least for Operation GRANBY in 1990-91, and more forcefully in Kosovo in 1999. What amount of budget will be spent nearly immediately on new, additional logistics vehicles?

• "Recent deployments have reinforced the importance of visibility of assets, and better understanding of the relationship between lead times and stockpiles, in order to improve the synergy between our stock-holding requirement and 'smart' contracts with industry (either to stockpile for us, or to manufacture quickly as and when required)."

Comment: It may be a cynical view, but the chances of MoD moving expeditiously to firm agreements with industry for equipment stockpiling or to keep production facilities standing ready are slim. What's the betting that there will be years of studies before anyone moves? This ought to be a simple task – but it won't be.

Logistics C3I: The story of practically every UK military operation since the Falklands – and probably before that – has been one of invisibility of assets and a struggle to know what was where, who had what and so on. And this surfaces in the National Audit Office's Operation TELIC report. So to repeat, why after so many warnings do these event continue without any firm changes being made?

And if there is a crucial item, it is the lack of an operational level logistics C3I system, let alone a strategic one. And as any fool knows, what priority does logistics get given on scarce communications nodes? Anyone replying "priority" is sadly mistaken. A basic sign of intent to make good obvious, even glaring, logistics deficiencies would be a putting forward of the money, within a year or so, to procure, not study, a logistics communications system. But why does one feel that 2004 will see little if any ground made on either logistics communications, let alone over-arching C4I equipment?

Is the question about logistics not one of technology but of application? How come there were functioning, adaptable, and far-from-bad logistics systems around in World Wars One and Two? Now some might say that for the former, the lack of mobility, and the ability to use fixed delivery structures such as railways made matters easy. But then, conversely, there were at least as many types of equipment and models. There was also less reliable equipment, requiring more spare parts, not fewer.

• UK Defence White Paper
• European Amphibious Initiative
• Defence Statistics
• British Army Future Rapid Effects System
• National Audit Office Operation Telic Report
• UK Defence White Paper
• UK White Paper: Logistics Issues
• UK White Paper: Procurement Issues
• Effects Based Operations
• New British Army Light Brigade
• Review of 2003
• Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft
• Preview of 2004
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• ARMED FORCES NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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