Operation TELIC: Further Lessons Learned
It Was Alright On The Night – Wasn't It?

In mid-2003, the UK's Ministry of Defence published its first take on "Lessons Learnt" from Operation TELIC in Iraq. A later, more-detailed, follow-on document was promised and duly arrived – slightly annoyingly – at the same time as the December 2003 Defence White Paper. Many of the topics touched in the new publication had been dealt with in some depth either in the first document or in other papers, even the Defence White Paper – and these Defence Analysis will not address again. But some new areas came to light.

Helicopter Operations

Defence Analysis commented last month on the fact that the Defence White Paper made no mention whatever of Support Helicopters (SH). Yes, to be sure, many words on strategic lift, heavy-lift aircraft and so forth – but nothing about the tactical enabler that is SH. So it is of more than of passing interest that these assets received attention in the Operation TELIC accompanying volume. And overall, the comments are encouraging for the SH's procurement fate – although precious few indications are given for timescales. Perhaps it might have been "better" if there had been disastrous SH failings …

"Several potential safety issues raised during this operation highlighted the need for support helicopters to be optimised for ship operations. Similarly, ships need large aviation platforms if heavy lift helicopters are to be operated safely and quickly."

NOTE: Chinooks are obviously a maritime operations hog – HMS Ocean can take 12-plus Sea Kings or Merlins plus a dozen smaller helicopters; HMS Ark Royal could take 5 Chinooks and 4 Sea Kings. But then, no Chinook, no airmobility! Lessons for other platforms, not least late Type 45s, then future logistic ships and amphibious transports?

"The initial plan had always depended heavily on helicopters both to insert the force and then sustain it. In an effort to reduce dependence on aviation, engineers operating from the shore and mine clearance divers, inserted by hovercraft from the sea, worked against the clock to try to clear a beach on Al Faw (Red Beach) large enough to land the light armour …"

NOTE: Gutsy – "insert" and "support" a brigade (-) force for a day certainly, possibly more. Bearing in mind 80-plus SH for the initial lift, we must assume that sustainment flights would be daily multiples of that number. Worth noting that there were not enough Chinooks or Sea Stallions to undertake CVR(T) lifts – or maybe that wasn't deemed a worthy use. One to look at? But SH operations are not the only rotary matters to be assessed. The role of attack helicopters also raises some interesting remarks and conclusions:

"RN Lynx and Gazelle helicopters provided effective armed support throughout the war-fighting phase of the campaign in the Al Faw Peninsula, firing 49 TOW missiles …. The contribution of these helicopters showed the potential utility of Apache helicopters in the provision of fire support during amphibious operations and across the battlespace …

This operation saw the first operational use of a combined arms aviation battle group, 3 Regiment Army Air Corps, equipped with Lynx armed with TOW missiles and Gazelle. As part of 16 Air Assault Brigade, the battle group had its own mission and area of operations in which to prosecute attacks using direct and indirect fire from infantry, armour, artillery and fast jets. Although the helicopters were engaged in direct firefights, firing 39 TOW missiles against Iraqi tanks …"

NOTE: A wee element of one-up-manship here? After all, 12 Royal Navy Lynx/Gazelles (six and six. By-the-way, read "Royal Marines") fired 49 TOWs, while 34 Army Air Corps Lynx Gazelles (18/16) fired 39. Much of this paragraph reads like an advert for the Royal Navy/Royal Marines – and there are many like this in the Iraq volume. The comments on Apache ought to be read as, "You remember that you deleted the Royal Marines' requirement for Apache? Dead wrong buddy: we're taking a minimum of a squadron and more like a regiment! After all, you won't need them …" On another line, a number of comments on the utility of Lynx means that the chances of the Battlefield Lynx (Ooops! "Light") Utility Helicopter going ahead ought to have risen. It looks as if with the relevant sensors and so on , as well as with a new set of weapons – Brimstone/Hellfire anyone? – Lynx makes an excellent companion for larger AHs.

Land Operations

"Smaller reconnaissance vehicles in the Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) fleet were also highly valued. The improved levels of ballistic protection fitted to these vehicles successfully reduced the risk from small arms and mines.

Their utility in this operation reinforced the requirement for maximum mobility, whilst maintaining stealth in order to carry out successful reconnaissance missions"

NOTE: Contrast this comment with the following: "The CVR(T) light armoured reconnaissance vehicles were not well-suited to fast moving offensive operations in open country, and their employment was constrained by a relative lack of mobility and protection and older generation optics."

This latter quote is from the 1992 Defence White Paper in the section on lessons of the 1990-91 Operation Granby. Shows what a little dieselisation can do! Remember, not much work has gone into the optics – that's still to come with Battle Group Thermal Imager. Raises the question of how far towards FRES does an "advanced" CVR(T) vehicle actually go? Some way, surely, if the FRES test force is to be based on CVR(T) …

"The powerful Brigade could have entered Az Zubayr (population 100,000) immediately, and even, subsequently, Basrah (population 1.25 million). But this would have inflicted unnecessary military and civilian casualties and considerable damage. The need to avoid comparisons with Grozny or Stalingrad influenced the plan – indeed such comparisons were probably what the Saddam regime wanted …"

NOTE: The US military relied almost exclusively on Israeli philosophy and doctrine on fighting in built-up areas – the UK was also lectured by the IDF on FIBUA. But those techniques tended towards Grozny/Stalingrad options and the British Army evidently ignored many of the "shoot first" IDF lessons.

Air Operations

"Although support for land forces from the air worked well, there remain areas for improvement. For example the coalition process for planning and tasking aircraft for high-tempo operations needs to be more flexible, and additional joint and combined land-air training is required. MOD has initiated a study into these issues."

"… further work is required to compress the planning cycle and improve the command and control, and coordination, of Interdiction and Close Air Support (CAS) missions. The prevalence of CAS missions in this campaign suggests there is a need to conduct more training in support of this role. To address these and other issues MOD has initiated a review of air support to land forces."

NOTE: In the aftermath of complaints that the RAF was too busy show-boating with its USAF buddies to back up the UK's ground forces, the RAF history of TALIC is to be made into a new film – "Hey Dude! Where's My Close Air Support?"

"The Maverick anti-armour missile was also used for the first time on this operation and proved its utility for rapid attacks on mobile targets. The standard infra-red guided Maverick was supplemented by the 'TV' guided version.

The TV Maverick's enhanced resolution of the image displayed in the cockpit improves a pilot's ability to destroy small tactical, mobile targets …. The Maverick missile proved a useful addition to the range of available RAF munitions, and the quantities held of both infra-red and TV versions are under review."

NOTE: The first we have heard of the TV Maverick being bought – borrowed? – by the RAF. Not that much of a surprise – after all, TV can be lock-after-launch, and thus used above cloud if necessary. There were comments made when IR Maverick was acquired as a UOR that it wouldn't solve the bad weather problem encountered by the RAF in Kosovo. A question: if Maverick is so wonderful, and a review – and Defence Analysis interprets a review as a "good thing" – is taking place, what does this say for Brimstone?

"… the Thermal Imaging and Airborne Laser Designation (TIALD) pod. Thirty such pods were deployed for this operation, and work is in hand to determine the utility of data-linking the imagery to ground stations and other aircraft. The TIALD pod was also used extensively during the campaign as a 'nontraditional' surveillance and reconnaissance tool …."

NOTE: The UK is becoming disturbingly adept at creating new capabilities out of tin cans and string. Strange, isn't it, that for a pod rejected by every other nation, TIALD is actually not bad at all.

Miscellany

"… while Tornado F3 fighters guarded the airspace ahead and to their flanks to prevent enemy fighters interfering with the mission."

NOTE: Stroll on! In 1991, the F3s were kept so far away from the frontline that it was joked that the crews should be awarded the South Africa Star! Obviously they are seen, even without the new SEAD capability – not deployed – as valid and valuable aircraft.

"Phoenix UAVs made a total of 138 flights during the operation. Of these flights, 23 ended in either the air vehicle being lost or damaged beyond repair, with a further 13 suffering damage that was repairable. The majority of losses were due to the technical problems of working in such an extreme climate …."

NOTE: A total of 89 Phoenix air vehicles were deployed along with four launchers. Interesting that 36 flights – 26 per cent of the total – ended with damage to the air vehicles. It was commented that after a while flights were made at night to exploit the UAVs' TI systems, possibly also to take advantage of night cover with regard to pesky machine gunners. A further lesson on the use of tactical UAVs – they get shot down.

"The Sea King Mk7 Air Surveillance and Control System performed well using its Searchwater 2000 radar, normally used over water, to provide battlefield surveillance and target cueing for UK land forces … At times, the Sea King provided the only dedicated stand-off sensor coverage for 3 Commando Brigade's operations on the Al Faw peninsula. However, in common with other helicopters, the Sea King is inherently vulnerable to ground-to-air threats, and following the experience on this operation, the utility of the Sea King in this joint role is being explored further."

NOTE: Surely the multi-role capability of the Sea King Mk7 was a major success? But does the barb about, "… inherently vulnerable …" mean that someone doesn't want planners to get the idea that helicopters have much use in the future, perhaps for an aircraft carrier? Defence Analysis believes that the multirole capability shown here is precisely the type of capability needed for small and medium-sized operations in the future. Anything bigger, you have either AWACS or ASTOR. A perfect gap filler?

"Movement of equipment and personnel by sea allowed the build-up of a substantial force in the Gulf, with over 90% of the freight deployed by ship. Military sea lift capability benefited from the recent introduction, some 20 months early, of MOD's four new roll-on-roll-off vessels procured through the Private Finance Initiative …. They were supplemented by the charter of 60 commercial ships."

"The costs of chartered air and sea lift capability were £53.5M and £70M respectively."

NOTE: The importance of the ro-ros cannot be overestimated – they are the UK's key force enablers. But look at the proportion of the freight going by sea – 90 per cent, higher than in 1990! Officially, the force deployed was of two light brigades – 3 and 16 – with only one heavy brigade. And yet the overwhelming majority of equipment goes by sea. Lesson here for the medium-weight force planners?

• French Procurement Issues
• UK Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft Programme
• UK Future Carrier Programme
• National Audit Office: Major Projects Report 2003
• UK Defence Budget Peak Spend Calculations
• Net Enabled Capability and Equipment Numbers
• Private Finance And The JAS-39 Gripen
• UK Private Finance Initiative Programmes
• Private Finance Initiative/Public-Private Partnership
• French Aircraft Carrier Design
• German Defence Budget
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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