UK Defence White Paper -Too Many Unanswered Questions

As with every policy statement emanating from the UK's Defence Ministry – and other MoDs for that matter – the devil is well and truly in the detail.

Unless one reads such statements closely, and in depth, vital facts might well slip through the cracks – and this is certainly true of the recent defence announcement.

THE BAD NEWS

• Saving For Investment

  At every stage in the document, as well as in presentations by both Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, and Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Michael Walker, the cuts are explained in a simple manner: i.e. they are to be implemented in order to release cash for investment in future equipment and capabilities. From the introduction to the document:

  "… we are pursuing radical change in the future force structure, reducing force levels in some capabilities in order to invest more in higher priority capabilities better able to achieve the effects we will require."

  General Walker talked of new capabilities such as Bowman and Astor. But hang on! What's so new about Bowman, Falcon, Cormorant, Watchkeeper and Astor?

  Few have entered frontline service and Watchkeeper has only just been awarded. But these are programmes that have been touted for some time – in Bowman's case, for close on two decades. Why was there absolutely no mention of additional future capabilities?

  Is this a harsh judgement? Not at all. It follows the age-old adage about newspapers: "Dog bites man – no story. Man bites dog – story!" So it's no good boasting of investment in FRES, for example – that is dog bites man. What one has to ask is how much more earth-shattering a cancellation of FRES would be. The same applies to Bowman, Astor and Watchkeeper.

  What is so disturbing is that all the talked-of savings – aircraft, ships and so forth – are not for the funding of major future defence procurements but for the raising of cash for current equipment plans. Is this not another sign of pressure in the present Equipment Plan? The cuts are NOT for investment – they are being made to cover shortfalls in current account spending.

• Future Spending

  The problem facing MoD is that much of the money arriving with the new budget period will be automatically eaten up by higher National Insurance payments, pensions, and so on. Taking IT "investment" aside, then each year some £300-400 million has to cover these costs, as well as inflation. It leaves precious little for new procurement or commitments. By FY06-07, there is an excess of commitments over resources, of some £250- 400 million. And the figure for the following year is simply not being looked at – it is too frightening.

• Medium Forces

  There is to be a move towards medium weight forces, and to that effect the balance between heavy tanks and lighter models is being addressed. But the numbers do not seem to add up. Take the letter to all units from CGS, General Sir Mike Jackson:

  "In the RAC we shall reduce by seven Challenger 2 squadrons. This will allow an armoured regiment to re-role to formation reconnaissance, and provide each of the armoured and mechanised brigades with its own reconnaissance regiment.

  It will also provide each of the armoured regiments in the mechanised brigades with a CVR(T) squadron as the first step in developing a medium armoured capability ahead of the introduction of Future Rapid Effects System (FRES)."

  Now, doesn't this suggest that in each of the five remaining armoured/mechanised brigades, one tank regiment will re-role to recce? In which case, where will the CVR(T) come from? We assume that for a recce role, CVR(T) would be the vehicle of choice. So, effectively, there will be a need for an extra 80 CVR(T)s to equip the new formation recce regiment, and a further 280-300 or so to equip the new recce regiments at brigade level. Oh, and for the tank regiments, an extra 60-80 more. All-in-all, a total 420-460 additional CVR(T)s of Scimitar/Spartan type.

  These figures are extra, above and beyond what is needed already. According to MoD figures, the UK has a total of 570 such vehicles in service today, with only some 200 "spare". In answer to a question on re-roling of 4 (Armoured) Brigade to become the lead FRES brigade, a senior Army officer said that with regard to spare CVR(T)s, "there are just" enough to do the job – with none to spare. And that was for one brigade. Is the answer to this equipment conundrum based on the smoke and mirrors of "whole fleet management"? If it is, then it's a con.

• Support Helicopters – The Sheer Brass!

  "Our battlefield and maritime helicopter forces, arguably the most capable in Europe, have demonstrated their versatility supporting the full spectrum of recent operations. Over the next ten years, we plan to invest some £3bn in helicopter platforms to replace and enhance our existing capability. This substantial investment within a relatively short timeframe will make it possible to produce future helicopter fleet focused on the key capability areas of lift, reconnaissance and attack, central to future expeditionary operations."

  Where to start with such an outright piece of sheer cheek? While acknowledging the importance of Support Helicopters – especially – what is in fact said here is that the Support Amphibious and Battlefield Rotorcraft (SABR) programme is being pushed to the right, as well as being cut back. Want proof of this? Well take the programme note from the Defence Procurement Agency's website. Look now quickly – before some webmaster closes the SABR page:

  "The estimated Development & Manufacture cost of the SABR programme is up to some £6.5bn."

  So, as of July 2004 – when the site was last updated – the DPA believed that it was managing a budget of some £6.5- billion. But the boss says that only some £3-billion is actually available. So a cut of over 50 per cent is nothing to get excited about. Obviously. And, much as with the bureaucracy that bedevils FRES, why claim that a ten-year procurement cycle is quick? That the choices could be made tomorrow and put into operation ASAP (as seen in previous Defence Analysis studies) does not enter the equation. Defence Analysis understands that in the period under study – 2005-2008 – slightly over £1.2-billion has been cut from SH and associated helicopter programme procurement. Call that an investment?

• Escort Numbers

  "The potential submarine threat to most future UK operations is likely to be very low … We have therefore decided to reduce our overall numbers of platforms optimised for antisubmarine warfare …"

  Arguably, even more than the regimental changes, this is the biggest error in this defence review. It ignores the simple fact that although the Type 23 frigates were originally designed for anti-submarine roles they have since been used for far more than that. The loss of three Type 23s means that Britain's precautionary ability to deploy ships across the world – a key principle of sea power – will be reduced. Against new generation threats such as terrorism, there is a need for hulls in the sea lanes to observe, board and search – UAVs and the like do not cut the mustard in this respect.

  The French study on future escort numbers observed that new platforms would be more capable than those they replace – but that the range and number of threats had risen, leading to a need for about the same number of hulls as before. And is the ASW threat really "… very low …"? Is this not looking like an assumption that could come back to bite at some time?

• Nimrod MPA Numbers

  "This shift of emphasis also allows us to meet our maritime reconnaissance needs with 16 Nimrod MR2 aircraft. The requirement could in future be met by a fleet of around 12 more capable Nimrod MRA4 aircraft …"

  OK, a cost cutter but short–sighted. To view Nimrod MR2 as a mere MPA was a grave error – to do the same for MRA4 constitutes a spectacular mistake.

  THE GOOD NEWS …

• C-17

  "To accommodate larger items we have already announced that we were considering the options for retention of C-17s after A400M enters service. I am pleased to announce that we intend to buy the current fleet of four at the conclusion of the current lease arrangement and to purchase one additional aircraft bringing our C-17 fleet up to five aircraft."

  This part of the Parliamentary statement went nearly unnoticed among all the talk of regimental cuts. It is surprising that such an unalloyed piece of "good news" was buried in a verbal compost heap. It has long been assumed that there was absolutely no way that either the RAF or PJHQ would willingly give up what the C-17 offers – but here was the proof.

  But just one question: why wait until the present lease comes to an end, when it is well known that the lease is dearer than outright ownership? Why not take advantage of terms offered by Boeing and convert the lease into a purchase, soonest? The question now is whether the cash can be found around the 2008-10 timeframe to buy another C-17, maybe two.

• Brigade Support

  This is another area where it is impossible not to agree with what is happening. More engineer squadrons are being raised to guarantee that all armoured and mechanised battlegroups have proper engineer support – and 3 (Commando) Brigade gets an extra squadron plus an HQ, boosting its capabilities greatly. Likewise, signals capability is raised by more troops to handle new equipment. And logistics reinforcement will ensure that all five armoured/mechanised brigades have full support troops establishments. In effect, these moves do make sense by increasing the Army's deployment capability.