UK Support Helicopter Programmes: Budget Sleight Of Hand?

The matter of Support Helicopters (SH) obviously irks and irritates the UK's Ministry of Defence's conscience [MoD? A conscience? Oh come on! : Dep. Ed.] as the many recent statements on how committed it is to modernising the force overall looks mighty suspicious. We get a strange feeling that pleading statement after pleading statement can look as much like guilt as anything! And the announcement to award the Land (Find) and Maritime (Surface) Attack helicopter programmes to AgustaWestland (offering Future Lynx) raises s many questions as it answers on the future of the other programmes that are meant to make up the UK's SH requirements.

Many may have missed – or turned the page – when they saw an announcement that AgustaWestland was awarded the first element of a 13-year support contract for the Sea King helicopter fleet, worth £300-million for the first five years. So what's new? The Defence Logistics Organisation pumps out contracts like this practically every week. But the devil here would seem to be in the detail ….

One oddity was that the declared Out Of Service Date (OSD) in the MoD press release for the last Sea King was stated as 2018. Yet only weeks before, in a House of Commons written answer, the following Sea King OSDs were listed:

Helicopter Type	Fleet Size	In-service Date	Planned Out of Service Date
Sea King Mk 3	19	1978	2017
Sea King Mk 3a	6	1996	2017
Sea King Mk 4	37	1979	2012
Sea King Mk 5	16	1981	2017
Sea King Mk 6	4	1988	2006
Sea King Mk 6c	5	2004	2008
Sea King Mk 7 shown left	11	2002	2017

So, within weeks, the Sea King OSD has already stretched out by a year, even if this is for the latest – the AEW&C – variant. But there also appears to be some confusion over the OSDs of the Search and Rescue (SAR) Mark 3/5 Sea Kings too. The Defence Procurement Agency web site refers to the replacement capability arrival "…early next decade."

And there is actually listed a planned date for rollout of the new SAR capability – 2007-2012. Is there not quite a bit of a difference between early next decade and 2017-18? Well, Defence Analysis believes so …. By the way, the DPA website was updated in January 2005, when a new IPT was established for the SAR capability, so we have to assume that there has been some incredibly rapid changing of in and out of service dates, as well as cost and programme profiles ….

But to return to – arguably – the knottiest SH question, that of the old, knackered Sea King Mark 4s, as used by the Royal Marines. With a 2012 OSD, oughtn't they to be the target of a major replacement programme starting sooner rather than later? One would think so. But does the new Sea King support programme mean that these will now be run on – run into the ground nearly – using better maintenance processes, plus the progressive cannibalisation of spares as Sea Kings from other parts of the fleet – ASW versions mainly – are retired? Does this sound like a ridiculous suggestion?

Not if you look at the other side of the SH equation. There used to be the Future Amphibious Support Helicopter (FASH), which was subsumed into the "Purple" SH programme, the Support Amphibious and Battlefield Rotorcraft (SABR). But in the aftermath of award of the Land (Find) and Maritime (Surface) Attack helicopter programmes to Future Lynx, SABR seems, if not to have fallen apart, to have become amoeba-like and split into smaller programme chunks. In fact, at the late March announcement of the Future Lynx award the next stage of the SH jigsaw was called "Land Lift (Medium)." How Purple is this?

The fact that the talk is of a land SH element suggests that the marine/amphibious element has been de facto stripped out, which might indicate that for the time being – a good few years for some – the Sea King Mark 4's will be run on. Does anyone believe that the prime reason for this is a need to save up-front money? Some might see this train of thought as too tenuous overall. But Defence Analysis believes that over the past few years MoD nomenclature has become extremely important – hence the change of the name to SABR in the first place.

So, to be very carping and nasty ….

• The Surface Combatant Maritime Rotorcraft (SCMR) and the Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter (BLUH) programmes had been valued at £750-million and £800- million. The new Land (Find) and Maritime (Surface) Attack helicopter programmes are now valued "in the region of £1-billion".
  Saving: £500-million+

• SABR has been split into several sub-programmes and it seems that the urgent need to replace the Sea King Mark 4s is shelved for the foreseeable future.
  Saving: Assume two squadrons of 12-14 helicopters plus reserves, £750-million.

• The only major SH programmes that might proceed in the near term is that to restore a dozen bust Chinook Mark 3s to working order – £250-300-million – and the Land Lift (Medium). Defence Analysis believes that the Chinook option looks at this stage to be the most likely, pushing back any announcement on replacing the rest of the Puma fleet until later on ….
  Saving: £200-300-million in the short to medium term.

So, does anyone still feel like trumpeting how amazing the spending on the SH fleet in the UK really is? The more that time passes the less that gets done – and the results are more limited.

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