UK-US Defence Relationship:
Separation by a Common Language – Or Just Deaf Ears?

It may be stressing the point a little too much but relations between the UK and USA are arguably not as good as they might be. The problems come down to the evergreen and thorny problem of defence technology transfer, at the nub of which is, currently, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Present stresses stem from the fact that the UK believes that it has an agreement with the US Department of Defense that allows transfer of technology essential for support of JSF in UK service. But even though a raft of technology agreements have been inked, as the time for production agreements looms, the UK feels that the USA is clamming up, and that future opportunities technology transfer diminish. And the stress cracks might go deeper than on JSF alone.

Is it the old adage of two nations separated by a common language that is at the heart if the problem? Or is it something deeper? Unfortunately, Defence Analysis believes that it not just the old language issue. And the concern is that there is a deliberate approach towards "misunderstandings" as time presses. Of late, there has been a new common line, primarily from industry but also from many US administration insiders.

"As far as we know, no official complaints about JSF workshare or technology transfer have been made by the UK," is the simple version, expressed by a senior Lockheed Martin advisor in mid-July. His words were almost identical to those of other senior LM managers at the Paris Air Show, and similar phrases have also been heard from the lips of administration officials too in recent months.

But let's go over the view from the other side.

"[Prime Minister] Blair mentioned JSF and technology transfer with President Bush in a side meeting at the G8 meeting at Gleneagles," said one UK official. He added that this was not some passing comment but was a very clear message about the UK's position. Another said, "I cannot think of a time when Blair has not mentioned JSF technology transfer to President Bush."

The view from within the Ministry of Defence is that the former Procurement Minister, Lord Bach of Lutterworth, spent much of his time on each of his visits to the US talking about JSF tech transfer and UK concerns, not just with Pentagon officials but also on Capitol Hill to the great and the good of both parties.

MISSED TRICK?

Perhaps the strangest element of the JSF tech transfer debate is that from the industrial viewpoint LM's playing its cards close to its chest means that it has probably missed a real trick. If, from the start, those elements of software that would allow easy integration of weapons had been released to the UK, then there would have been an instant effect on the long term future of the UK aircraft design capability: i.e. there wouldn't have been one.

But by being guarded and restrictive, and holding out for the most restrictive tech transfer agreements, the US side of the equation seems to have guaranteed that JSF will not be the last manned combat aircraft ever built: there will be another one in Europe, be it a stretch of Typhoon or a new platform. If the US industry had been looking to use JSF as a Trojan Horse to knock out the UK aerospace industry, it can now be seen to have failed. Quite recently, official statements were made in the House of Commons on the UK's position regarding significant portions of the JSF build programme:

"Mr. Ingram: We have a requirement for a Maintenance, Repair and Upgrade capability to provide sovereign support for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) throughout its planned service life. Following on from the Rand study, further investigations are underway between BAES, DTI and MOD, to explore the possible synergy between this and a Final Assembly and Check Out facility based in the UK."

It is difficult to see how UK requirements for JSF through-life support in a UK-based facility can be satisfied without significant elements of technology transfer.

Initially, senior Royal Air Force officers too gave background briefings in which they privately voiced their concerns over JSF technology transfer. But during the past year they have broken cover to express their views openly:

"I am interested in an aircraft that we can maintain over its operational life … so we have to be able to modify and adapt it."

" … what we in the UK wish to see for our industry … we want high value work that creates intellectual property in the UK. This is talked about in terms of technology transfer."

"If the programme does not deliver the outcomes that I have outlined, then we would have to think very hard."

Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Air Staff and incoming Chief of the Defence Staff.

"With any aircraft in my inventory, I need the ability to modify it rapidly … we need the intellectual understanding close at hand in the UK to do this."

"Upgrades via software patches sent over the internet from the USA? I don't think so."

Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, Commander-in- Chief Strike Command.

These views have not exclusively expressed in meetings with journalists but have also been raised with opposite numbers in the USA too. Can they be any clearer?

So we are left with the information that heads of state have conferred about tech transfer, and JSF in particular; that British politicians have discussed tech transfer with their opposite numbers; and service chiefs have also raised the matter on a number of occasions. So why is there a growing US view that there is no British apprehension over technology transfer?

Could it be a clever attempt to split the various strands of the debate within the UK, especially between industry and government? Well, this seems quite likely. If constant pressure from BAES is brought up, it tends to be dismissed by the US side: "Well, of course you'd expect BAES to say that," is the default response.

Could it be a careful attempt, playing on innocent misunderstandings, to take the different voices that emanate from the UK and rather than hear them as a whole, to listen to them individually, and not join all of the messages together?

Meanwhile there are the first signs that the JSF troubles have led to some different thinking in the UK on other programmes. The UK's position of unease vis-à-vis the USA and tech transfer can also be seen from the approach towards UAVs and UCAVs. While the original decision to join with the USA on UAV/UCAV R&D might be seen as a sign that London was pinning its unmanned colours firmly to the mast of Washington DC, consider in that context the written answer given by Armed Forces Minister, Adam Ingram, on 5 July 2005:

"Mr. Ingram: The Ministry of Defence is pursuing a twintrack strategy to explore the conceptual thinking and underlying technology for unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs). The former involves participation in the US Joint Unmanned Combat Air System Programme concept work. The latter is focused on ensuring the UK is able to make intelligent choices with respect to UCAV design, technology development and manufacture, and is intended to enhance the UK's industrial position to undertake either an indigenous or collaborative programme should a firm military requirement for UCAVs emerge in the future."

This would indicate that it is much less obvious that the UK is blindly following the USA in the UAV/UCAV sphere – twin track after all. And although there is no explicit mention of the French-led Neuron programme, it is not ruled out by any means.

The most "extreme" view on how to manage the tech transfer issue sees the UK adopting a much more joined-up position. Rather than talking about technology transfer in one forum, intelligence matters in another and then operational ones in a third, why not look at them all at once, in the round? This line of thought is expressed very simply: "If British troops are good enough to fight and die alongside US troops, then why are British forces treated so shabbily when it comes to technology transfer?"

WHO CARES? AND WHY?

Is there a split within the UK industrial community over the tech transfer issue? One British source within these circles said in mid-July, "It's really only BAES that wants the ITAR waiver so badly. If you talk to Rolls Royce and Smiths, they are really much more relaxed." Of course, there is a slight difference between the end results of Rolls Royce and Smiths compared with BAES regarding tech transfer – BAES could cease to be a serious player in combat aircraft development.

The other two would still, largely on the back of commercial programmes, be viable in their fields. But it does perhaps bring to the fore a serious point in that that the UK's industrial negotiating position might not be as coherent as that of, say, Italy.

Rome has presented a united front insofar as an overhaul/maintenance plant is concerned, and there has also been a strong drive to get a Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) facility too. Signs are that Italy's lobbying might well be winning a better hearing for it in US government circles than the UK.

Perhaps there is also a desire in the US to "give" Italy something to dissuade Rome from curtailing its role in the programme, or even pulling out. Perhaps there is a lesson for UK PLC here – being stroppy can win results.

So there is a body of opinion that believes that London should be saying, "As you think so little of us, then you obviously don't want our forces in Iraq … or Afghanistan." And bearing in mind how over-stretched American forces are, there could well be some negotiating ploy here.

One British diplomatic source said that this type of pressure had been considered prior to the deployment of UK troops to Kuwait in 2002, leading up to the Iraq Campaign in 2003. But it was deemed to be too much of a "nuclear option". "This is very high stakes poker – you have to really mean what you are threatening," said this source. And this perhaps shows that London probably cannot play such poker – the poker face or the steel guts don't apparently exist.

What will happen in coming next weeks and months? The argument is that the ticking of the JSF production contract clock will force compromise. To prove to Congress that JSF is a crucial programme, the Pentagon needs to show that there are so many partners on board that the project cannot be cancelled or altered radically.

If so, that means compromise on tech transfer and maintenance/overhaul lines. But another, alternative view, while acknowledging the same pressure, concludes: that the US still has countries such as the UK and Italy – which need carrier-based aviation assets – over a barrel. The longer that the clock ticks on, the more money the overseas customers will have put into JSF – with fewer options for a carrier-borne aircraft. Time will tell.

• UK Procurement Dynamics
• R&D Data
• UK Defence Budget And Statistics
• UK Future Rapid Effects System Programme
• The Struggle For Market Share In The UK
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Market
• European Industrial Consolidation
• European Communications Market
• German Defence Relations
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS

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