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Early September saw the conclusion of one of the more long-running defence contests, that to supply Singapore
with a new fighter aircraft. Or, as Defence Analysis will argue, did it? At face value, a result was the outcome, after
France's Dassault Aviation announced that the island state had selected the F-15K (the version designed for South
Korea) over the Rafale. Many had suspected when the contest was reduced to just Rafale and the F-15K that the likely winner would be the American offering. And such was the result. On a curious note, it was Dassault who announced the result – or even its withdrawal from the contest? – before the Singaporean state did. As ever, numerous issues come into focus as a result of this competition, issues that might have wider implications.
Will Singapore Actually Buy Anything?
There is a growing school of thought that says that Singapore might not actually buy any new fighter at all, even with the downselect of the F-15K. Days after the announcement it was said that senior Boeing officials were a long way from booking the order in their financial results – on the contrary, Boeing was reported as telling a fair few people that there was still quite some way to go in negotiations. Pessimists point to the fact that this programme has already seen more stops and starts than most – so if that is the history, why could it not be repeated?
Analysts suggest that the pressure on Singapore with regard to defence is not really in fighter aircraft but is elsewhere. Although Malaysia is generally building up its own armed forces, it is not at the spectacular rate as was once feared by Singapore, while Indonesia is also proceeding at a far slower upgrade pace. So why does Singapore need a new combat aircraft if the current F-16 fleet can meet current and projected threats? And isn't Singapore's eye really on JSF? If this sticks to an approximate 2012–14 ISD for export customers, wouldn't it make more sense just to leapfrog to the next generation aircraft? Many still see this as the major game in town for Singapore.
Regional analysts believe that Singapore's present priorities lie more in the naval domain – sea control, naval power projection and so forth. The need to ensure that the Lafayette-class frigates perform is key to Singapore, and will arguably eat up more funding than might have been the case. If naval matters are the priority, then don't bet on an early signature of the F-15K deal........ Also, think of the impact of high oil prices on the Singaporean economy. If high oil prices persist, then there will be an effect – muted at present – on the economy and the ability to buy new defence equipment.
RAFALE
So near, yet so far. If the French company is to be
believed, it got to the final two in both South Korea and
Singapore, only to be beaten by F-15K. Some might
regard being beaten by an aircraft with a design heritage
stretching back to the early 1970s as quite an insult. But
there are signs, that Dassault has now woken up to, that
explain why F-15K won and Rafale lost.
Criticism has been levelled at Rafale's radar and engines. The former are still short on puff, especially when it comes to hot-and-high performance, while the latter – a passive electronic scan antenna – has long been regarded by American and British radar experts as a technological dead end.
What is evident is that Dassault is pressing ahead, in concert with Thales, to finish developing an active array radar that could replace Rafale's present RBE-2, and both will probably spend some tens of millions of euros trying to achieve this. Whereas the original fielding date for an active array radar had been pencilled in by the French government around 2012–14, some now talk of an accelerated programme that could advance that date by up to two years.
Dassault has also said to have been told by Singapore that it was not too impressed by the "swing/omni role" capabilities – "show us, properly" was the call. And as a result, Dassault has accelerated – with PV money – integration of the Meteor BVRAAM to Rafale. This is well worth watching, as France/Rafale was to be the last European customer nation for Meteor: JAS-39 Gripen was to be the lead aircraft for integration, Typhoon next and Rafale at the end. Once again, Dassault is biting the bullet and attacking known weaknesses head on. This can only be admired.
But the engine issue will hamper Dassault and Rafale. While a new radar, a programme already a good five or more years into the swing of things might cost the odd hundred million euros, a new engine is in the order of billions of euros, especially if the development and test programme is accelerated. And for the past few years, every attempt to get either the French government, or someone else, to provide the cash, has hit a brick wall. The M-88 engine looks set to be a running sore for some time, and one over which Rafale will get adverse comparisons with Typhoon, which has 20–35 per cent more power to date from its EJ200 engines, with a planned, risk-managed growth path to increase engine power.
Each campaign contested, then lost, has heavy impact on Dassault. French domestic aircraft procurement has practically always been predicated on good, strong exports – just look at the Mirage F1 and Mirage 2000. There is no evidence that calculations made by industry and the French Defence Ministry were any different for Rafale than for earlier generation aircraft. A further worry is going to be that, like wild animals smelling fear, future potential customers will know that Dassault needs an export sale, and so will be able to make greater demands. This could end up as a vicious circle if Dassault isn't careful. And it will – naturally – wish to avoid the fate of Giat Industries, taking a contract at a price below the economic breakeven level, and then losing billions.
TYPHOON
Look at it this way: being pushed out of the
contest was bad, but at least Dassault didn't win …
Eurofighter can dust its corporate self down, and move on
to the next competition, wherever that may be. Typhoon
can still point to one outright win – Austria – and a de
facto win – Greece, although this has been re-opened. If
one wishes to play playground games, than Typhoon can
say that it has won export sales so far.
That gives some, perhaps minor – sheen of respectability, which can be used to show Rafale in a poor light in future contests. But there has to be some serious debate about why Typhoon is not winning high profile competitions in countries such as Singapore and South Korea, even though the aircraft reportedly gets good marks in technical evaluations.
It should be of major concern to the Typhoon team that Dassault is biting the bullet, and starting to invest ever more serious sums of money on Rafale with regard to presently-lacking capabilities. There is a vital lesson here: Rafale is a one-nation, single prime contractor programme. Thus, decision-making is almost inevitably faster than for a four-nation programme. So Dassault could well be starting to steal a march over Typhoon with regard to integration of Meteor, and also of vital weapons for which there are no plans for Typhoon, such as anti-ship missiles.
Until Typhoon can be seen to properly use precisionguided bombs – JDAM, Paveway, Enhanced Paveway – on a regular basis then it will lack creditability as a multirole, or even swing role, aircraft. And if Dassault can accelerate development of extra capabilities for Rafale, isn't there a lesson for Eurofighter's industrial partners? They might well have to find the odd hundred million euros or so to emulate Dassault. But can they agree on this? After all, agreement on an accelerated development programme took close to two years of negotiation, so there is no reason to believe why a new decision would take any less.
FUTURE CONTESTS
As each contest ends, so attention turns to another, or simply the next in line. And such is the case now. All the French newspapers had lines that were the equivalent of a tired Gallic shrug, with a look ahead to the next contest.
Saudi Arabia: It was strange that Les Echos went big on the prospects in Saudi Arabia. In April, Les Echos broke a story that a Memorandum of Understanding to buy 48 Rafales, with an option for another 48, was on the verge of inking. Oddly enough, Dassault issued a public statement denying that there were any active talks and that there was any MoU either ready for signature, let alone near to being agreed.
So why raise the spectre of a Saudi deal if it is generally acknowledged that pre-announcing deals is the kiss of death? Desperation on the part of a government minister or aide briefing Les Echos perhaps? Riyadh should be getting close to a decision on replacing its early model F-15s, and the high oil price helps. But what impact would a deal to enhance the Tornado strike fleet have? Wouldn't that reduce the need for multirole aircraft? And although relations between Paris and Riyadh are good – sometimes even very good – might there not be a feeling that France has a very high, perhaps too high, share of equipment in the Saudi Navy and Air Defence forces?
Turkey : has recently risen up the lists, primarily over dissatisfaction with the terms of trade and industrial work on JSF. Strangely, this would probably not see Rafale with a serious chance. It's just that the National Assembly in Paris keeps having votes to commemorate the Armenian Massacres of 1915, which, of course, didn't exist … or something. Talk is that attention is on Typhoon. But defeat can be snatched from the jaws of victory.
Greece: should return to the fighter table sometime in the next two to three years. In which case, will Athens merely opt for Typhoon, as it did before, or will there be a real re-opening of the contest? Perhaps the decider in both Turkey and Greece will be Germany, which, historically, has good relations with both Ankara and Athens
Norway: looks, as yet, to still be a straight run-off between JSF (increasingly unpopular due to workshare issues) and Typhoon. Rafale was pretty categorically ruled at the last assessment – but that was over three years ago, and much water has flowed under the bridge, so Rafale could bid again.
The Netherlands: would be Defence Analysis's wild card for a new fighter programme. Although a member of the JSF programme, disquiet over workshare could well see the Dutch "doing a Norway", and re-examining their role in the programme. A decision over the next 18 months? _

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