"Going ballistic"
- the SANDF six years on -

25 August 2000

DSD's South African correspondent, Leon Engelbrecht, is keeping track of the transformation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the challenges it still faces, six years after integrating soldiers and combatants from as many as nine different armed forces.

This feature is part of that process. Winston Churchill believed criticism performs the same function as pain. "It hurts, but more important, it identifies that which needs attention."

Leon Engelbrecht's essay is written in that spirit. He offers a candid insight into the challenges that surround racial harmony and operational efficiency within the SANDF.

It is now a month since a young officer killed his company commander at the Phalaborwa army base. It is also just a month short of the first anniversary of a similar killing at Tempe, Bloemfontein, in September last year.

And still the main questions lie unanswered: What drives an "officer and a gentleman" to kill? And what can be done about it? A first step would be to identify the grievances that led to murder, and defuse them - before more soldiers "go postal". That American colloquialism refers to the habit of "disgruntled postal employees" to go on wild shooting rampages inside US post offices. As Defence Minister Mosuioa Lekota has found, many of our soldiers are indeed disgruntled, and urgent measures must be taken before more "go postal" or, perhaps more military-correct, "go ballistic".

Lekota rightly believes that servicemen and women are disgruntled because of three factors: racism; the abuse of power by some superiors, and; a lack of discipline by some superiors and by some subordinates. But some of the complaints Lekota heard from soldiers at Phalaborwa, Pietersburg and Nelspruit over the last few weeks do not neatly fit into this category. These include long delays in the issuance of medals, certificates and other qualifications, as well as some officers covering up the illegal activities of colleagues and a the habit of commanders to engage in "sunshine reporting" - describing only those positive aspects they think their superiors want to hear.

Lekota was outraged to find that many of the reports reaching him through the SANDF and the Army (Head) Office bore little resemblance to the truth. This led him to accuse the command cadre of 7 SA Infantry (SAI) Battalion of lying to him and "the nation". It also caused him to go on a controversial tour of bases to find out the facts for himself - a decision that should not be criticised under the circumstances.

Way Ahead

Clearly, any further debate over the Phalaborwa-killing, in July, and the Tempe massacre, in September last year, should focus on solutions, not problems.

On Monday morning, July 10th, Lt Harry Ntoagae shot dead Maj Piet van As in his company headquarters at 7 SAI Battalion. Ntoagae afterwards surrendered to police. Initial reports claimed the two were on a good footing and that the cause of the killing was a mystery. Lies, Lekota later said. The facts and Ntoagae's motive must still be determined by a court of law. It will be wrong to anticipate its findings. But, on inspection, Lekota found 7 SAI Battalion a cauldron of discontent. He also found the unit's leadership had failed to address the unrest and had even attempted to cover it up.

Reports to the Army Office contained much fiction and stooges were briefed to mislead the Setai ministerial committee. (The committee, headed by former Free State DG, Betheul Setai, was set up after Tempe to investigate racism and determine the true state of transformation in the SANDF). Lekota found that black troops were being called "kaffirs" and "baboons"; that troops, white and black, were often given the choice between an common assault and a "DD 1" charge sheet after an alleged disciplinary offence, and; that some monies owed to troops had gone missing.

In September last year, another young officer, Lt Sibusiso Madubela, went on a "rampage" at 1 SAI Battalion, at Tempe, Bloemfontein. Madubela shot dead seven officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and a civilian clerk. He shot and injured five others before being shot dead himself. One later died in hospital. Like Ntoagae he was black and shot dead whites with a R4 assault rifle.

A judicial inquest into the deaths heard argument that the SANDF knew Madubela was "quick- tempered, easily provoked and an unfit officer", yet did nothing. Marie Lombard, widow of Sergeant Major Johan Lombard, one of the dead, claimed the SANDF was in possession of a 1997 report indicating that Madubela was unfit to have access to firearms. She told SAPA it was seen by a number of other witnesses in his personnel file. The report is now missing and its existence is in dispute.

The inquest also heard evidence that Madubela would "not have been tolerated in the former SA Defence Force", and that his "troublesome character" had been reported to the "command structure on numerous occasions". Several witnesses said the SANDF appeared to be having difficulty "getting rid of troublemakers and underachievers in its midst."

On the other hand, a psychologist testified that the SANDF has acted too harshly when it suspended Madubela's salary after he was declared "absent without leave", for not returning promptly from his father's funeral. He arrived back two weeks after the four-day leave period expired. African tradition requires elaborate funeral rituals. His parental home was also in the remote hinterland, requiring much travelling time. Military psychologist, Lieutenant-Colonel Marius Riaan Olivier said Madubela became increasingly disillusioned with the SANDF, and finally snapped when his salary was discontinued - apparently sparking his rampage.

Olivier said Madubela, a former Azanian People's Liberation Army soldier, underwent major personality changes since joining the SANDF. Although many of his colleagues perceived him to be arrogant, undisciplined, aggressive and racist, family and friends described him as quiet, tolerant and peace loving. After joining the SANDF he became frustrated at the lack of transformation, racism, and the fact that he was not sent on courses required for his promotion. The inquest heard that Madubela associated whites with the system he felt had betrayed him, and believed that they were conspiring against him.

The Police Service

But the SANDF is not the only state institution so affected. It is probably only a matter of time before a similar outrage occurs in the so- called Police Service. Many of the same problems exist. The West Rand area (covering Roodepoort, Krugersdorp and other districts in western Gauteng) may serve as a typical example. "Jungle justice", the abuse of internal disciplinary means for pursuing private vendettas and plain old malicious racism is rife there. Until as late as 1996 its Krugersdorp head office was a whites-only "Volkstaat", complete with right wing views and attitudes.

The Area Commissioner is now Coloured, but little else has changed. His white staff seemingly show him little loyalty and less respect. He is often racially abused (behind his back, of course). "Kaffir", "Hotnot" and "Baster" (Half-breed) seem to be preferred. Other staff members, present and past have also been victimised by this racist clique.

Some years ago a Coloured woman was racially abused for dating a white man. Her so-called commander and others in the section concerned harassed her, tried to prove poor work performance on her part and laid vexatious disciplinary charges against her. These are now being investigated by the police's national head office and the Department of State Expenditure and justice may yet be done. Another woman was not so fortunate.

A white typist in the same office was eventually driven to suicide by the same commander for siding with her Coloured colleague. Another white woman, the wife of a senior officer based in Soweto is the current project. Her "crime": Her husband treats his black colleagues as equals and often invites them home for social functions. Her "punishment": ostracism and victimisation.

What does Lekota's charges and his other discoveries, as well as the inquest's finding's amount to? What would Safety and Security Minister Steve Tshwete find on the West Rand? Policing union, Popcru, interviewed some time ago thought it showed opposition to the country's transformation and a refusal to change personal attitudes. The South African National Defence Union (SANDU) thinks it is a labour issue. Union general secretary Cor van Niekerk says the antiquated Defence Act, that dates from 1957, is blocking the proper addressing of grievances through his union.

The rival SA Security Forces Union broadly agrees, but believes race also played a major factor. And if some theorists are to be believed, this can be deconstructed as a form of class conflict. While the reasons for institutional class conflict between junior (and upwardly mobile officers) and their seniors remain unclear, it is clear, from international experience, that unions in the military are more likely a hindrance than a help.

A Question of Leadership

So where does that leave us in our quest for solutions? It leaves us before the realisation that the problem with the SANDF (and the Army in particular) lies with its officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and their perception of, and training in, leadership, management and discipline.

If we for a moment compare this leadership cadre with a computer, we may find that especially more senior officers, warrant officers and NCOs have been programmed with corrupt software in their early careers and from there stems the identified problems. Returning to reality, it appears that the SANDF does not train its officers as officers. This is borne out by remarks made to Beeld at the weekend by some white officers at Pietersburg and Phalaborwa that they are resigning because of "impossible demands".

Is it unfair to expect officers to be leaders? US Army Major Christopher Kolenda recently wrote in his corps' professional journal, Armor, that "to lead means to inspire others to follow willingly. Leaders do this by articulating a meaningful vision and a sound plan to get there, by being trustworthy in terms of character and competence, by instilling discipline and a winning attitude, and by making sound decisions." These are not impossible demands. Neither is a prohibition on common assault.

Many of the military's generals also seem to have an unhealthy obsession with the management sciences. Just how large this "MBA culture" looms can be seen in the present structure of the Department of Defence. As part of its "dynamic" transformation process, started in 1994, the SANDF headquarters expanded from five general staff divisions to 18. Consultants were paid millions to advise and help the process. At the same time much of this information was available from other militaries:- free. Current SANDF chief, General Siphiwe Nyanda, has reportedly found the structure unworkable and has made certain changes. The SANDF is remaining mum on what these are.

The separate Service headquarters were also closed and transformed into "offices", and make up for of the current 18 divisions. These were to be smaller than their antecedents, but paper and practice didn't match. The service head office for the Army is by all accounts much larger and far more bureaucratic than the former Potgieter Street Headquarters. There are now more committees, taking more minutes, wasting more hours and making less decisions than ever before.

What can be done to change the situation? A valuable first step will be to make it clear to the SANDF's officers, WOs and NCOs that they are firstly leaders of men and secondly managers of material. The fascination with managing "human resources" must be ended.

Emphasis must be placed on leading soldiers in battle and in training them as one will lead them in the fight. In this regard valuable work is already being done at the Army Gymnasium (the Army's basic officer and NCO training centre) and by the Sergeant Major of the Army, Koos Moorcroft's platoon leadership improvement programme. But more could be done.

On the management side, emphasis should be placed on proper administration. Unnecessary paperwork must be eliminated and the processing of that which remain must be speeded up. It cannot take a year to answer a query simply because no-one wants to assume responsibility. In this regard, the relationship between responsibility, authority and accountability cannot be overstressed. People can only be held accountable for their responsibilities if they have the required authority. Lekota must ensure the SANDF leaders have the authority required to discharge their responsibilities. He must then ensure they do so, by holding them accountable - or an increasingly dissatisfied Parliament will.

At the same time, we should objectively investigate whether our officers are "gentlemen" or indeed "officers" in the internationally accepted sense. Several of the practices current in the SANDF (and the SADF) were and are anathema in the US, UK, France and other leading militaries. These include the very young age at which officers are commissioned, their corresponding immaturity and lack of life skills, the ease with which senior NCOs and WOs can become senior officers, and the lack of an officer culture in the SANDF. The latter died with the "Afrikanerisation" of the Union Defence Force by the National Party government in 1948. It is now time to reintroduce and enforce internationally accepted standards and military culture.

A third, and important, step will be addressing professionalism.. There is a persistent myth that the apartheid-era SADF was a superbly professional force and any problems on this score today is the direct result of integrating the "totally unprofessional" MK, Apla and the TBVC forces into it. It is time to demolish both parts of that myth.

Professionalism is not stripping a machine gun blind-folded or rattling off platoon battle drills. Professionalism is doing your job to the best of your ability, at all times and under all conditions. Its hallmark is constant discussion and self-education. The former South African Defence Force (SADF)leaders spent far more time discussing the sport field than the battlefield. This has not changed. Professional officers, like Major Kolenda, spend all their working time and much of their free time studying. They read a great deal. They write and publish articles in professional and popular journals. They mentor their subordinates. They receive guidance from their superiors.

Here it is a rare to find officers, WOs and NCOs reading, let alone writing. A very few do. In Ghana, officer cadets are required to read around 20 books as part of their education. They are also required to purchase the books out of their salaries. These then form the basis of their professional libraries. How many of our young officers have anything that compares? Only the ignorant and grossly arrogant would still call the former SADF professional. The writer expects the flood of letter from retired senior officers, who have never previously written a letter to the editor to "reject with contempt" this assertion to prove his point. The vehemence of the reaction will likely be directly proportional to their own short-comings.

The same can be said of the myth of SADF invincibility. Those claiming the SADF was the most powerful military in Africa are actually identifying it as the schoolyard bully. As Evita Bezuidenhout said, "big brother is only big when surrounded by small people". A writer recently compared the SADF with the Italian Army of the Mussolini era. The fascist element aside, he said the Italian Army, armed with tanks, aircraft and poison gas performed quite well against the horse-backed Ethiopians in 1936 but, a few brilliant ripostes aside, quickly collapsed in the face of Commonwealth troops a scant four years later. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (of Deutsche Afrika Korps fame), who did not suffer fools gladly, thought highly of the Italian soldier but found they suffered much from poor equipment and bad leadership.

Also, what exactly was wrong with the education received by Apla and MK officers in Russia, East Germany, Cuba and India? The military education systems there were (are) no worse than that of the SADF/SANDF and were/are, sadly, objectively better in many aspects.

Lekota should encourage military leaders to get this cycle of reading and writing going here. He must also remove the impediments that prevent promising officers going overseas to study there. For the last five years the US has routinely budgeted close to a million dollars for South Africans to train at their military schools - at the American taxpayer's expense. Very few have gone and most of the money remains unspent.

The obstacle? The SANDF says it cannot afford to pay them the allowances they would be entitled to. And so for the lack of a few rand valuable educational opportunities go lost. The irony is officers, WOs and NCOs polled would only be to glad to forfeit these allowances for the opportunity to go. That is, the few that know there are such opportunities. There is hope...

Conclusions

But such opportunities will be worthless unless another aspect of professionalism is addressed: Plowing back what you have learned. In the late 1970's the SADF developed a relatively sophisticated doctrine for mechanised warfare. It then largely ignored that doctrine during actual operations but still taught the doctrine at its schools.

It is not clear whether it ever updated its manuals in light of actual experience (unlike the US, local professional journals are poorly supported and unlike there, where the entire post-Vietnam rebuild of the US was thoroughly discussed, nothing of the sort happened here). Anecdotal evidence and senior sources suggest they have not. Is this perhaps a core reason for the debacle in Lesotho? Ex-SADF officers have carried over into the SANDF the bad practice of not teaching others their experience. Thus, the SANDF often doesn't train the way it will fight, a well-known recipe for disaster.

In the final analysis, Lekota must be congratulated for his initiatives. At a recent under-reported briefing on the Phalaborwa-matter, Parliament's defence portfolio committee expressed extreme dissatisfaction at the state of discipline in the military. Lekota then asked them to help him amend the current, over-generous legislation related to absenteeism. The briefing, called by the committee, was another indication of Parliament's ongoing drive for stronger oversight of government departments. It is clear the committee wants the military to get its house in order. And it is equally clear the minister has every intention of ensuring this is done. Meanwhile, Tshwete and his sometimes-undiplomatic national police commissioner, Jackie Selebi, still have their unpleasant surprises ahead of them.

REF XQQFS

editor@defence-data.com

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