From Spitfire to Eurofighter
The RAF's Legacy

26 October 2000

Introduction

Lord Trenchard's name is, of course, synonymous with the birth of the Royal Air Force, for he presided over its first twelve years of existence. Trenchard himself disliked the term 'Father of the Royal Air Force', believing that Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson was more deserving of the epithet. This is typical of the Trenchard story and it strikes me as somewhat surprising that there is no biography of him still in print. It may well be time for a historian today to revisit such a worthy subject.

I suspect that it would be almost as difficult for Trenchard [pictured left] to imagine the RAF of the 21st century as it is for us to appreciate his times. Take his own story for example. He was commissioned into the Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1893 at the age of 20. By 1912, he had served in India and South Africa. He had been shot in the lung and partially paralysed only to recover through competing in the Cresta Run during his convalescence. As a 39 year old major with no obvious career ahead of him, he decided to seek his fortune in the Royal Flying Corps. His flying training lasted but 13 days, during which he amassed the grand total of 74 minutes in the air to gain his wings - a far cry from my own training and that which we plan for the next generation of aircrew.

But it was training that was perhaps Trenchard's most important legacy to the RAF. He realised that if his fledgling service was to survive, it needed the means to sustain itself and this meant a solid foundation of training establishments. The Cadet College at Cranwell, the Apprentice School at Halton and the Staff College at Andover were all founded in this early period. We should also remember that the Short Service Commission Scheme for pilots was introduced in 1919 and in 1925 the first Auxiliary Squadrons and University Air Squadrons were formed. All of this was achieved in a relatively short time by Trenchard and in spite of the criticism he received for creating an air force with more buildings than aircraft.

However, the massive expansion of the Royal Air Force just prior to the start of the Second World War would have been impossible without this emphasis on training. He was known to have said that 'he had laid down the foundations for a castle but if it only remained a cottage, that it would be a very fine cottage'. We should not forget that vision, which has a distinct resonance today.

Trenchard was also very much at the centre of the development of air power during the First World War and was to remain highly influential beyond his retirement in 1930. Hansard is littered with his warnings of the dire state of his service during the inter-war years of neglect. In retrospect, it is clear that he overstated the efficacy of strategic bombing, but as Henry Probert makes clear in his chapter (in High Commanders of the Royal Air Force), Trenchard could hardly have been expected to predict the technological advances that were to reduce the power of the bomber and change the face of air warfare so dramatically. An excellent example of these advances is, of course, the development of radar, the impact of which during the Second World War and the Battle of Britain in particular, should not be underestimated.

Honouring the 'Few'

This year, of course, marks the 60th Anniversary of that Battle, an anniversary which, like others from that time, is likely to be the last significant milestone at which, sadly, we can expect veterans to be on parade in large numbers. The Battle of Britain will not, however, be allowed to fade away either in terms of our cognisance of the huge debt that we owe to 'The Few' and the many unsung heroes that supported them, or of its significance in the history of our nation. No matter how often historians may choose to revisit or revise events of the past, there can be no doubt that the UK stood alone against a serious and determined enemy.

It remains a source of great pride and inspiration to all who have worn 'light blue' uniforms since that epic contest, that not only was our nation saved by air power through denying the enemy control of the air, but so was the wider sweep of civilisation. Beyond the wholly fitting tribute to those who took part in the Battle, it is also worth acknowledging the debt that we owe those who laid the foundations for the Command that Sir Hugh Dowding led so brilliantly.

Contrary to the popular myth that the RAF had been totally fixated on strategic bombing in the inter-war years - leavened by excursions of air policing in Iraq - much work was done in preparing the doctrine for the defence of the UK and laying down the operational requirements for fighter aircraft such as the Hurricane and Spitfire. The British aircraft industry revelled in the challenge, as did the manufacturers of engines. As government finance became increasingly available, so industry spooled up for what was going to be a longer struggle than just the Battle of Britain.

Of the many lessons that can be learned from history, by warriors of whatever colour cloth, the enduring lesson that came from the events of 1940 was the vital importance of control of the air. While this flows through the veins of every aviator, it is also close to the hearts of soldiers and sailors. The message was reinforced in every subsequent campaign in the Second World War no matter whether it was maritime, land or air. The same message was again evident ten years later when UN forces were involved in the skies over Korea and anyone who was closely involved in the military operations to retake the Falkland Islands will have no doubt of the continuing veracity of Montgomery's dictum that 'loss of control of the air results in an early loss of the war.'

Air operations during the Gulf War and subsequently in the Balkans have shown graphically what can be done with air superiority or, better still, air supremacy. And no one should be in any doubt that air superiority was not ceded in the face of overwhelming Coalition or NATO firepower. It had to be fought for, established, and then maintained - exactly as was the case over Normandy in 1944 and then Korea. Control of the air can never be taken for granted. Investment in the design, development and deployment of aircraft such as the Eurofighter is neither done on a whim, nor merely to look good at air shows. As in the past, the aircrew of tomorrow with their weapons systems of the 21st century must be ready in every potential conflict scenario to gain air dominance.

While control of the air denies the enemy scope to use his own air assets in the way that he would wish, the benefits extend much further than limitation or denial. They also go beyond allowing friendly forces to prosecute their own campaign free from interference. Control of the air, most importantly, allows the Joint Force Commander to shape the battlespace - ranging from space itself, through the conventional battlefield to the depths of the oceans - in order that he can maximise his own strengths to the discomfort of the foe. This shaping of the battlespace is fundamental to the concept of manoeuvre warfare, which lies at the heart of British defence doctrine and thinking.

Exploiting the information

But air power clearly contributes far more than just the potential to establish control of the air. It is self-evident that a commander must have access to relevant and timely information, and this is invariably best gathered by air or space platforms, themselves as diverse as imaging satellites and modern airborne radars such as ASTOR. The assets involved may come from any of our own services, or from those of our allies. They must, however, be coordinated if the synergy required for manoeuvre warfare is to be achieved. Moreover, the benefits are at their greatest when air dominance allows untrammelled access to the air and space medium.

It is equally important that the information gathered by the array of platforms that are likely to be deployed is assessed and then distributed in as timely a manner as possible. In the ideal world we will then be able to reduce the operational decision making cycle (or the sensor-to-shooter time) to close to real time. This is a challenge facing armed forces the world over, and I am confident that my own service, in concert with our colleagues in industry, is well placed to play a leading role in the quest for information dominance.

Having achieved control of the air and found the enemy, we must then attack him, either to destroy his assets outright, or more likely to shatter his will and cohesion. Air power is in its element in this area with its speed of response, reach and versatility - particularly as it remains an inherently offensive means of warfighting. Moreover, it has the ability easily to raise and lower the tempo of operations to match the political scenario, and it can be effected without getting ones fingers too enmeshed in the mangle.

Operations may be in direct support of ground troops who are engaged with the enemy, but are more likely to be mounted against more distant targets. Delivery platforms themselves should no longer be designated strategic or tactical - it is the nature of the task being carried out that dictates the level of warfare. Strategic bombing does not now infer the massive area bombing associated with the strategic offensives of the last World War and of Vietnam.

A single weapon dropped from a tactical aircraft can now achieve a strategic effect, while traditional strategic assets such as the B52 drop cluster bombs, albeit lots of them, on massed troops or armour - very much a tactical role. Air power will continue to have great utility in both direct and indirect air operations to enable joint or combined warfare and indirect operations will continue to shape and prepare the battlespace for the arrival of surface forces. Meanwhile, direct air operations can prove decisive in concentrating force and allowing freedom in the air to complement maritime or ground force manoeuvre. Neither will this use of air power for strategic effect be limited to bombardment or attack, as it is likely to encompass the whole spectrum of roles and mission types.

No military campaign will succeed without combat support air operations. Such assets are pervasive in the prosecution of all joint and multinational operations, and can be used to enhance and multiply various forms of combat power. Suppression of enemy air defences is the precursor of almost any campaign and while the work of the tanker force goes largely unsung, its contribution is simply vital to the conduct of modern air operations. Assuming an opponent retaliates, then the force protection of all air and surface elements also takes on a crucial importance.

This is not a new revelation, but resources are limited and we are increasingly restricted to fighting with what we have. Consequently, a full programme of active and passive defence and recuperation measures will be required to preserve our limited assets. In the RAF, that role has been adopted and developed by the RAF Regiment. They have demonstrated an expertise second to none and we will see their employment increasingly in a joint environment.

The final task of air power is sustainment - an all embracing concept which includes manpower, equipment and logistics. Combat power forms the physical component of our 'fighting power'. While sustainability forms an integral part of that physical component it can also have a marked effect on the other two, namely the conceptual component and the moral component. To put it in simple terms, a perfect plan is not worth the paper it is written on if it cannot be sustained, and the fastest way to undermine the morale of a fighting force is to fail to sustain it properly.

Air power - a force for peace

The utility of air power in combat operations is now beyond doubt. But in the difficult and uncertain circumstances of the world today, air power also has much to offer to help preserve and strengthen international security. We in the RAF take considerable pride in our many contributions to disaster relief and, by its very existence, air power also offers a most useful contribution to the preservation of peace, first through the promotion of international relations and secondly through the provision of reassurance that should help avert threats to peace, either real or imagined.

Our ability to carry out the roles I have outlined will remain inextricably linked to our weapons systems and so to the speed of technological change. Hence we need to be prudent in developing our future systems and carefully balance the military needs of the new operating environment with the art of the possible. Given sufficient money, some will tell you that almost anything is technologically feasible. We are not, nor likely to be, in that fortunate position and so the traditional balancing of priorities will continue. Frequently, incremental improvement will play a major part in our procurement of capability.

I am, of course, delighted that the RAF will benefit immediately from the real increase in defence monies and the announcement that we will take forward the highest priority programmes - PGMs, Maverick and secure communications - which, despite our substantial contribution to NATO's success emerged from an analysis of the Kosovo Air War. Another important factor is the constructive working relationship we enjoy with our defence industries, while the effective use of limited research and development funds has often allowed us to respond quickly to new requirements. Indeed, in recent times, much of the development and testing of specialist new systems has been conducted during live operations.

The introduction of our Thermal Imaging and Airborne Laser Designation pod during the Gulf War and the development of our current range of reconnaissance pods during policing operations over Iraq are good examples. As a result, the UK remains a world leader in certain key military technologies such as airborne reconnaissance, the development of designation capabilities as well as our skills in collecting and fusing passive electronic warfare and signals intelligence data.

The future use of space, of course, offers enormous potential but, for many, affordability will be difficult. Current military operations already rely heavily on space-based support systems and the US forces are considering migrating several roles, in particular their Warning and Control System, into space. The cost of such programmes will remain beyond most but however limited our ability to contribute and participate in the American space programme, we should persist and offer our support. The benefits that we accrue from being involved, albeit only in a small way, in the development of these leading edge technologies are substantial.

Currently the key enabling technology, that appears to bring the greatest advantage, albeit at a hefty price, remains stealth, epitomised in the F-117, B-2 and F-22 aircraft. While most nations will try to develop this technology and incorporate it in their future designs, it is unlikely that many will have the resources fully to exploit its benefits. While stealth proved its value beyond all doubt in the Gulf War and has contributed much to the development of future systems, last year's operations over Yugoslavia have shown that it is not invulnerable; thus countermeasures may be developed which could in time, render the technology obsolescent. Nevertheless, we should for the moment look to incorporate stealth wherever it is technically feasible and sensible to do so.

The success of multi-role platforms such as F-16, F-18 and Strike Eagle have perhaps demonstrated the way forward for many air forces. Aircraft will remain expensive to develop but offer unrivalled flexibility over unmanned systems or missiles. Collaborative development, therefore, offers some help with the immense costs involved and, always provided that collaboration does not lead to unnecessary compromise, can enhance interoperability and ease sustainability. Multi-roling reduces the number of platform types required, thereby keeping running costs down, but also leads to a steep increase in training requirements for crews.

Awaiting the Typhoon

The RAF is, of course, eagerly anticipating the arrival of Eurofighter into service, an aircraft which is an excellent example of a modern multi-role platform. It will provide air superiority, employing its supersonic dry power cruise and +9/-3g agility and able to operate from runways of 700 meters length; it will be capable of operating with a full air-to-air suite, including Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles and the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile, while carrying our future range of air to ground weapons such as Storm Shadow, Brimstone and Paveway III.

In due course, Eurofighter, like all of our current fast jet inventory will acquire a reconnaissance capability. The aircraft's advanced features such as Voice Throttle and Stick Control and a Helmet Mounted Sighting system offer enhanced flexibility through the application of advanced technology, and will relieve the pilot from the cockpit workloads and physical demands created by the aircraft's operating regime. Eurofighter/Typhoon has generated wide international interest and looks set to be a world class aircraft with substantial benefits for interoperability.

Eurofighter, together with our future inventory of laser and autonomously guided munitions, together with stand-off systems such as Storm Shadow and the programmable intelligence of Brimstone, will provide a broad capability across the full range of potential targets and political constraints. To these we will also add the Harrier replacement and a Future Offensive Air Capability.

These new systems will clearly need to be complementary to the Eurofighter and to one another. The Future Offensive Air Capability options range from unmanned combat air vehicles to large aeroplanes carrying long-range stand-off weapons. The utility and effectiveness of unmanned aircraft will undoubtedly be part of this debate, and quite rightly so, but it is one that we should engage in with sober reflection.

Unmanned Air Vehicles and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles do not necessarily offer a cheap and simple solution in acquisition terms. The sensors and data links will have to be every bit as good - if not better - than on a manned system, not least because the crew member will not be on hand to cope with degraded situations. Moreover, establishing and maintaining information dominance would be even more vital if we were to use such platforms.

Progress in technology is mirrored by advances in international law with which weapons systems and their employment must remain consistent. Potential problems in this area range from issues of overflight to rules of engagement. There is also a philosophical issue in pursuing this option of unmanned vehicles if it is being driven solely by the quest for risk-free warfare.

Commanders of all of the services in this country and throughout NATO have been faced with huge challenges over the last decade in responding to sudden and drastic changes to the world order. Force structures and equipment programmes could not be radically changed overnight, and it is probably fair to say with hindsight that effective change was impeded by the race for 'peace dividends' and that a more rational approach has only come about through measured reflection - processes such as the Strategic Defence Review. The expeditionary nature of warfare has emerged, not surprisingly, as a common theme from these deliberations. Furthermore, the nature of the process has allowed us, and our allies on both sides of the Atlantic more easily to quantify the scale of likely involvement and the resultant force structures that we will need.

The recently announced decision to enhance our strategic lift capability, in the short term with C-l7s and subsequently with A400Ms, is evidence of determination and commitment in this area. Further work is being done in the vital area of air-to-air refuelling and we are also looking at improving our capabilities in the suppression of enemy air defences. No matter how desirable or even essential, these improvements and enhancements may seem -particularly by those closest to the coal-face whether they be in industry or on the frontline - there is no possibility of getting everything on our wish lists. Some acquisitions will be funded through savings in the logistics and support area. For other additions to our overall capability, we may have to look to greater co-operation with our allies.

Having examined the roles for air power and looked at the effects of technology on our future inventories, I would be remiss if I did not finish by saying something about the people that actually produce this air power. Since the Cold War, the demands we place on our personnel and their expectations have changed considerably; their training and retention now represents the single biggest challenge that we face as a service.

The pull of commercial aviation and the defence industry more widely has ensured a steady exodus of high quality people This flow has been exacerbated by successive reviews and studies that have reduced our uniformed manpower by over 40 per cent since 1990. Add to this insecurity and its associated turbulence, the redeployment of Harrier and Tornado units back from Germany involves inter-unit moves for more than 16 500 servicemen and their families - the pressures of current operations, where many are regularly experiencing four months or more per year away from home, to which must be added time for exercise deployments, and the Armed Forces present a less attractive proposition for a full career.

Now more than ever before we must ensure that our terms and conditions of service reflect the aspirations and concerns of our existing people and of those we hope will join us. No longer can we assume an unlimited queue of quality recruits committed to a full career and who regard the service of their country as a vocation. We are competing against an ever more voracious and enticing civilian job market where incentives abound and stability is a matter of choice.

To this end, we are urgently reviewing and monitoring sensitive areas in order that we can deregulate wherever possible. While it would be foolhardy to try and cater for every individual moan and groan, we must go as far as we can to remove systematic obstructions and adopt a more flexible approach to personnel management. In the first instance, we are looking at ways by which we can spread the load of operational deployments as widely as possible across the whole of the RAF, but this will take time and the options are limited.

In the meantime, the underlying requirement is for our people to feel that their contribution to the generation of air power is important and is valued by those in command. It is the contribution of the men and women in the air power loop that make it so flexible and provide the free-thinking and innovative approach that our chosen medium demands. Yes, technology can and will provide invaluable assistance, but it is the practioners both on the ground and in the air, who refine and fuse the information, and ultimately arrive at the decisions that make the difference.

Upholding Trenchard's legacy

The continuing success of the RAF will thus depend on recruiting and retaining highly trained and motivated men and women all capable of operating in a joint environment, but imbued with the ethos, history and pride of their parent service. These sentiments, I am sure, would win the approval of Trenchard if he was here with us today.

It follows from everything I have said that the role required of the RAF is increasingly important, and the demands placed upon it are higher than ever. Recently, it has seemed that, for those who get their information from the media, there are doubts about whether we can fulfil this role or meet those demands. While we will brush aside gross misinterpretations of our capabilities and our plans, it is vital that everyone within the RAF, and all of those with whom we have to deal, know the truth, which is that the men and women who serve are as good as they have ever been and that we have forward plans that will make sure we retain our fighting edge. As Chief of the Air Staff, I am absolutely committed to maintaining our excellence so that we can fight and win in the world which I describe.

There is little doubt in my mind that not only will the world remain unstable well into this new century, but the pressure on us all to act as a force for good will also increase. That said, to be a force for good requires a credible and effective warfighting capability, and I am equally certain that air power - ranging from Tomahawk missiles to attack helicopters - will increasingly be the weapon of first political choice in anything but a benign environment. As experience of real operations and wars continues to increase - as opposed to traditional stovepipe-style exercises - I am confident that air power will also be at the forefront of all military commanders' minds.

This does not mean that air power can solve all ills, and we must guard against making such claims. But the ability of air power to strike at the complete range of targets from those of the utmost strategic value down to the smallest tactical levels will guarantee its place in the vanguard of any offensive operation. Equally the range and required speed of response in humanitarian and peace support operations will mean that air power will inevitably be required as an essential enabler. Balancing these often-competing priorities will be one of the great challenges facing the RAF in the next decade.

It is a challenge in which I am confident that we have the people and equipment to meet. It is an Air Force that Trenchard would have some difficulty in recognising, but I have no doubt that he would regard the young men and women who fill our ranks with vitality and commitment as every bit the equal of those who graduated from the quite remarkable training institutions he established. Some cottage indeed!!

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