22 August 2003

By George (Sam) Hamontree

DSD thanks and congratulates Sam Hamontree for this thought provoking paper, which he wrote whilst at the US Air War College. What follows is an extract from Sam's research paper. The content represents the author's own opinions and not in any way those of the US Government or Military.

Sam Hamontree would welcome DSD readers' feedback and comments on his article. Please E-mail your remarks to Sam Hamontree.

"Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent." [1] President George W. Bush, West Point, New York June 1, 2002

The US National Security Strategy (NSS) has always had shortcomings in promoting democracy and building a strong relationship between the Middle East and the United States. The Middle East has several long-term issues that influence politics and diplomacy in the region. As a result, the Middle East is best analyzed as two distinct systems; the Arab-Israeli conflict system and this Persian Gulf system. This article is focused on the Persian Gulf system. [2] However, world events, US support, issues, and conflict within the Arab-Israeli conflict system have secondary and tertiary effects on politics, foreign and domestic issues and diplomacy in the Middle East.

Since Operation Desert Shield, the United States has led coalitions and conducted military operations and exercises to promote stability and build relations with the Middle East. Over time, engagement in the Middle East for the right purpose should have doctrinally resulted in a stronger relationship in the region. The National Military Strategy (NMS) prescribes engagement activities such as information sharing and a wide range of contacts between the US military and Middle East countries to promote trust, confidence, and security.[3]

U.S. military operations in Desert Storm and military advancement in technologies have been considered a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).[4] However in the Middle East, the ability to shape the regional combatant commander's Area of Responsibility (AOR) to build strong relationships has not been matched by the same advancements in technology and capabilities. Over the last ten years, discontent and distrust for the United States in the Middle East has only degraded the United States' credibility and ability to promote democratic values and personal liberties in the region.

What are the National Security and Military Strategies?

National security strategy – The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to the national security. [5] Joint Publication 3.0

To have a broader understanding of the national security strategy, it is important to know how the strategy is received and executed through the NMS. The NSS provides a broad overview on the United States' views, goals, and approaches to preserve our national interests at home and abroad. It also provides the guidance for the nation's instruments of power to include the military to develop their own policies for implementations. President George W. Bush signed the current NSS on September 12, 2002.

The previous NSS from the 1990s focused on two grand strategy visions: selective engagement and cooperative security. It is important to refer to the previous NSS because its strengths and weaknesses have long-term effects on the world today. [6] The military takes guidance from the NSS to form its NMS. The NMS supports the NSS to help achieve the nation's overarching goals. For example the Commander, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) translates objectives of the NSS into the USCENTCOM goals: promote regional stability, ensure uninterrupted access to resources and markets, maintain freedom of navigation, protect US citizens and property, and promote the security of regional friends and allies. These goals are challenging in a region that is assessed as being versatile and volatile. [7]

The NSS is also commonly referred to as the Grand Strategy or National Strategy. [8] The NSS tends to heavily favor the cooperative security grand strategy vision, and its goals are to promote political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. Both the current and previous NSS addressed what is acceptable and right in the promotion of democracy and human rights. However, in the NSS Chapter "Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts", the strategy addresses the Arab-Israeli conflict system with no mention of democracy or human rights concerns in the Persian Gulf System. Both strategies selectively chose which regions not to promote democracy and human rights. Does Saudi Arabia's trillions of dollars invested in the US stock market and banks influence why the Middle East has received negligible attention to democracy and human rights? [9]

The NMS is derived from the NSS and focuses to promote peace, deter aggression, and failing that, fight and win wars. [10] The importance of the NMS in the execution of the NSS in the Middle East is the military is fully capable of fighting and winning wars; however, the military requires collective support and guidance to properly promote peace, democratic values, and human rights among the populace in the countries of the Middle East. The capability of the military and other instruments of power promoting peace in the Middle East has been significantly reduced since 1994. [11]

The time difference between the current NSS and NMS is five years spanning three Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and two presidents. Traditionally, the military at all echelons takes guidance from higher headquarters to produce a product with the available and appropriate assets in a format that is consistent with higher guidance. The current 1997 NMS does not follow the same methodical process as the NSS nor does it specifically correlate how the military will fulfill its duties as the government's military instrument of power. The military is long overdue for a NMS that is synchronized with the strategies of the current NSS.

What are the Effects of the NSS in the Middle East?

"You may take the most gallant sailor, the most intrepidairman, or the most audacious soldier, put them at a table together – what do you get? The sum of all of their fears." [12] Winston Churchill, 1943

In the Middle East, the United States has led some of the greatest modern military operational victories: Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Operationally, the US military instrument of power is advanced, lethal and victorious on the modern battlefield. Along with coalition forces, US sailors, airmen, soldiers and Marines and other governmental departments, have successfully exercised the ability to wage war and achieve decisive military operational victories.

However, the US successes of removing militarily oppressive regimes are quickly overshadowed by skeptical Islamic populations and regimes that are quick to oppose US efforts to save or free other people from the same type of oppression and predicament. This should raise a few questions: Why do Muslims, saved from genocide in Bosnia by US-supported forces, condemn the US trying to liberate Iraqis from an oppressive regime?

Also why do Afghans, freed from the oppression of the Taliban, one year later condemn and protest US efforts to remove Saddam Hussein's oppressive government, wave pictures of Saddam Hussein in the streets and refer to Saddam Hussein as their "Muslim brother"? How does a US strategy with ten years of engagement in the Middle East result in the strong collective public opposition to US led efforts against the Iraqi regime?

The US Strategy has inadequately applied its instruments of power to effectively conduct engagement operations and promote policies to the appropriate audiences abroad, especially in the Middle East. The NSS of the 1990s placed Middle East oil at the forefront of US national interests in the region that reinforced the need for engagement and stability in the Middle East. The Middle East provided the US a substantial amount of natural resources and in turn, democracy and human rights in the Middle East were not pursued by the US. The ramifications of this strategy have significant impacts on perceptions of regimes and their populace in the Middle East. Regimes in the region and those affected outside of the region are skeptical about the motives of US intervention in the Middle East due to the US interest in a commodity-driven strategy and the lack of selectively not pursuing human rights and democracies in the Middle East.

During Operation Desert Storm most of the Middle East countries supported the US-led coalition against the Iraqi regime. After ten years of engagement in the Middle East, the US led another coalition against Iraq. This time however, most regimes in the Middle East were concerned how the military actions would affect post war availability and effects of natural resources on their countries and its political effects, to include stability.

Globally, protestors commonly associated the US military actions in both operations as "Blood for Oil". [13] The NSS labeling the oil in the Middle East as a US vital interest gives great concern for the perception of the motives of the US in the Middle East. [14] A commodity-driven strategy in a region with political, religious, and cultural differences further complicates US attempts in building good public relations. The current Bush NSS omits addressing specific commodities as vital interests and focuses on building stronger global economies, trade, and a safer world through rooting out terrorism and promoting human rights.

Military engagement activities in the Middle East have resulted in a significant increase of governmental spending. Since the first Gulf War, Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch have accumulated significant financial costs. The estimated operational cost for Operation Iraqi Freedom was 100 billion dollars that does not include the negotiations of billions of dollars for using Turkey's ports, air bases and infrastructure. [15]

At the operational level, regional combatant commanders sacrificed the cost of making vital sea and air power assets available in their areas of responsibility. For over 10 years services have had to make adjustments for the deployment of personnel and equipment. The commitment of military forces to operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and the resulting stabilization requirements causes the US government to continue to incur a large financial expenditure in the Middle East. As the US enters its fourth year of a recession, how strong will the US public's commitment continue to support the cost of the strategy?

Risks also complicate executing the NSS in the Middle East. The political risks associated with conflict between Israel and Palestine serves as a thermometer in the Middle East. US responses to actions and reactions in the conflict serve as the mercury level that influences public opinion and regimes policies in the Middle East. Political risks are not the sole concern. Force protection risks associated with service members serving in the region are a major consideration. Islamic Jihad and radical fundamentalists continue to threaten US interests and increase the requirements for force protection. Bombings and terrorists attacks against US and Western assets in the Middle East range from small-scale incidents of kidnapping and murder to very well planned large, structured attacks against targets such as the Khobar Towers.

Regional stability is complicated for the NSS to address and engage within the Middle East. While the US government exercises strong separation of church and state within its own borders, outside its borders there is little concern for the effects of the mixture. The predominately Muslim based non-democratic regimes in the Middle East are tolerant of radical Islamism. Religion is used to empower the leaders with oppressive powers and uncontested control of the media, law, and order in the Middle East and is not condemned by the West. In democratic states, problems are raised and dealt with by the elected officials. The problems are either adequately addressed or the elected officials are not re-elected. In states without a democratic process and not tolerant of criticism, scapegoats are used to diffuse the disgruntled populace. The most common scapegoats in the Middle East are Israel, and US/western culture, which are characterized in the "infidel category".

The Middle East media and regimes uncontested blaming of western culture over many years for their unjust conditions causes the common person in the Middle East to develop mistrust and ill feelings toward the western culture and perpetuates the ill feelings towards the "infidels". However, the Middle East regimes' manipulation of information is a double-edged sword. While the populace continues to be reinforced with negative images of the West through the controlled media, Middle East regimes know the importance of cooperation and importance in working closely with the western governments. Examples of the biased, religion induced anti-western propaganda were evident in the reporting of Islamic newspapers before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the following public stances were given in April 2003:

• A pro-Western and OEF coalition ally, Jordan's King Abdullah stepped up his anti-war rhetoric in the face of recent countrywide demonstrations. The Jordanian journalist Abdulateef Arabiyat best summarized the predicament by saying, "Everyone in the area is saying the same the thing – that this campaign is against the Arab nation, and he who has been sleeping has woken up. The Americans are insulting everybody, not just Saddam Hussein or the Iraqis".

• The Vice President of Indonesia, an OEF coalition ally, publicly stated that President Bush is the "King of Terrorists".

• The Syrian government organized anti-war demonstrations and chose to align themselves with "the brotherly Iraqi people".

• After the Egyptian president's picture was burned during an early war protest, Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party, another OEF ally began staging anti-war demonstrations to calm the populace. They even allowed members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood to assist in keeping order.

• Turkey, an OEF coalition has been a US ally for many years providing strategic basing, strong NATO alliance, strategic geographical basing, and secular ties between the Western and Islamic civilization. However Turkey denied US ground combat forces access through Turkey in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. [16]

• The best example of Middle East regime hypocrisy and induced anti-western propaganda to the populace was the public position of most Middle Eastern countries before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The overwhelming majority of Middle Eastern regimes publicly informed their populace they were opposed to the use of military force by a US-led coalition in a possible conflict with Iraq. However, the same regimes privately provided assistance to the Iraqi regime overthrow with the preparation, over flight, basing, and logistics support for Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition forces.

At the operational and tactical level, the Middle East regimes' covert support of US and coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom was vital to the swift military defeat. However strategically, the overt public condemnation of the US-led military invasion in Iraq by many of the same Middle Eastern regimes only reinforced the Middle Eastern public's years of disinformation that the US is bad and has ill motives. The fall out of public opinion so mistrustful of the US and Coalition efforts to rebuild Iraq poses a strategic threat for the future stability in the AOR. Although the actions of US and Coalition forces restored a tremendous amount of freedom and liberties to the Afghans from the brutal and oppressive Taliban rule, there were still large Afghani anti-war protests and demonstrations supporting Saddam Hussein and condemning US-led military actions in Iraq.

The NSS and NMS do not address such state and religious sensitivities or volatility that has such an impact and influence in the Persian Gulf System. The current strategy relies on building strong public relations that are non-existent in most Middle Eastern countries. The National Security Strategy's inadequacy to build favorable public relations in the Middles East directly contributed to the strong Arab public anger that has been directed at the US. However, a greater strategic loss resulted from Arab officials that privately supported the US, but publicly supported and sponsored demonstrations against the US government's plans in Iraq. [17]

How does the US effectively promote democracy, human rights and regional stability in the Middle East?

"America must stand firmly for the non-negotiable demands of dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property." [18] NSS 2002

While there are many variables in engaging the Middle East, the goodwill and intent of the NSS must fulfill its staunch stance on promoting democracies and human rights, and push for political reform in the Middle East. Currently there are only a few democracies in the Middle East. Attempts to promote democratic rule are quickly condemned by the Muslim community as a threat to the power set in place. Human rights such as freedom of religion are almost non-existent in the Middle East. Egypt is one of the more liberal Muslim nations and still does not formally allow Christian missionaries access to Egypt in an evangelizing capacity. Restrictions of religious freedoms are not restricted to non-Islamic faiths. For example in Iraq, Islamic denominations such as the Sunnis and Shiites have been severely oppressed in the past.

The US with multinational support must execute the security strategy with diplomatic influence, economic pressure, and engagement to implement the nonnegotiable demands of dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; freedom of speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property in the Middle East. The current NSS has made political progress in establishing virtue versus commodity based vital interests driving the US strategy, at least on paper. This new approach will not have a significant impact on the Middle East perceptions of the US intentions in their region until its instruments of power address the strategy.

The US must take the lead in truly promoting democratic values and human rights in the Middle East; a lead that does not necessarily mean regime change by force and occupation. Human right violations that are unacceptable in Western society, should also be are unacceptable in the Middle East. Human rights are universal, not culturally dependent. There is apprehensiveness about promoting democratic values and human rights in regions that possess economic influence, and the Western culture does not understand. Alternatives to censored media and education at all levels must be available for the public in the Middle East to hear, see and decide for themselves what opinions to form. Alternative sources of media must be provided to objectively stimulate critical thinking to the populace.

To critically and objectively think in the future about improving strategic relations in the Middle East, it is paramount to have democratic values and human rights in the education systems in the Middle Eastern. Where permitted, there are US government and non-government programs that sponsor education and promote democratic values and human rights in education programs around the world. In Africa, there are public and Koranic education systems that allow US assistance in their education systems. This interaction in both secular and non-secular education systems should be aggressively pursued in the Middle Eastern education system.

The positive side of the strategic setbacks in the Middle East is that the NSS plan is good and the instruments of power are eager to implement. All the instruments of power need now is the political and financial backing to implement and be successful.

Bibliography:

[1] The United States National Security Strategy, 2, September 2002.
[2] Katzman, Kenneth Dr, Searching for Stable Peace in the Persian Gulf, 2, US Army War College, February, 2,1998.
[3] The National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era, 6-7, Government Printing Office, 1997.
[4] Chilcoat, Richard A. Major General, Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders, 2, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 10 October, 1995.
[5] Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter II 1-23, 10 September 2001 Government Printing Office.
[6] Posen, Barry, Competing Visions for a Grand Strategy, 5-53 International Security, 1997.
[7] Franks, Tommy R., Prepared Statement, 28 March, House Armed Service Committee, 2001.
[8] Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter II 1-23, 10 September 2001 Government Printing Office.
[9] Baer, Robert, Readers Digest, July 2003, excerpt from "Sleeping with the Devil".
[10] The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 200, Chapter 2, 7-22, 2000, US Government Printing Office.
[11] Steinke, Ralph R. and Tarbet, Brian L., Theater Engagement Plans: A strategic Tool or a Waste of Time, 70-71, Parameters, Spring 2000.
[12] Churchill, Winston, The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 3rd Ed, 150, Book Club Associates, 1980.
[13] Vinocur, John, 2, International Herald Tribune, APR 8, 2003.
[14] National Security Strategy,1997.
[15] Hartley, Professor, Dayliner, 24 March, 2003.
[16] The Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 2003
[17] UPI Analysis: Arab Protests Worry Regimes, 24 March 2003
[18] US Nation Security Strategy, 2002.
[19] Edwards, Tyron D.D., The New Dictionary of Thoughts, 645 United States of America, 1965.

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