Iraq Attack: Key Factors
The New Face of Warfare?

Afghanistan was a nightmare when it came to access for aircraft – no bases in Iran, none in Pakistan, none in India, and only eventually bases in former Soviet Republics north of the border. Access was by sea-based aircraft and long-range bombers operating from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Mission ranges were measured in the many hundreds of kilometres, more often in the low thousands.

Would anything be so different for attacks on Iraq? Possibly not. Saudi airbases such as Tabuk and Al Sulayl are now out of bounds, as almost certainly Kuwaiti bases will be. The closest bases for use – those at Incerlik and Diyarbakir in Turkey – might be close to the Iraqi border but are further away from the centre of gravity of Saddam Hussein's regime, Baghdad. Take the following approximate distances:

• Diyarbakir (Turkey) to Baghdad: 750-800km
• Akrotiri (Cyprus) to Baghdad: 1100-1200km
• Doha (Qatar) to Baghdad: 1200km
• Bahrain to Baghdad: 1100km

And now take some selected combat radii for non-flight-refuelled US aircraft:

• F-16 1050km
• F/A-18 650km
• F-15E 1275km

The anticipated ranges for attack on Iraq mean that all US aircraft will be at the extremes of their internal fuel ranges. So, as with Afghanistan, trade-offs between payload and fuel may well be necessary.

But the principle is simple – it will be increasingly pointless to design limited-range aircraft. Range is arguably the key criterion now for any combat aircraft – it could be argued that range should take priority over such factors as stealth.

Afghanistan showed that the bomber was still "king" – the reliable B-52s, B-1s and B-2s will show that they are still vital items in the US arsenal over Iraqi skies.

As an aside, if Defence Analysis is correct about range and that range/payload is the crucial design criteria for modern combat aircraft, then the four Typhoon partners should (a) accelerate service delivery of the new 2000 l fuel tank, and (b) bring forward development, test, and production of the proposed over-wing conformal fuel tanks. The same is true for both the Dassault Rafale and the Saab-BAES JAS-39 Gripen.

TANKER AIRCRAFT

It should go without saying that if combat radii are rising, then the need for tankers will rise commensurately. Afghanistan showed how short of tankers the US Navy and US Marine Corps are, and how much they loved their British buddies with those quaint hose-and-drogue Tristars and VC-10s! But the US Air Force is arguably not much better off for tanker assets – as was shown during Kosovo, when on occasions there was demand for tankers when none were to hand.

If real capability = range = fuel, then tanker size is definitely going to be a factor. It is more and more a belief of Defence Analysis – entirely unsupported by hard facts – that there is little mileage in buying smaller tankers. There are many examples of campaigns or battles that were lost due to lack of logistic support – but none where a battle was lost by having too many logistical resources.

COMBAT RANGE: ROTARY WING

What's sauce for the fixed-winged goose is sauce for the rotary-winged gander. If use of Kuwait is a "no-no", and any access to north Iraq has to come from Diyarbakir – 250km from the Iraqi border – then the real need is for helicopters with (a) good internal tank range, (b) possible in-flight refuelling and (c) large payload.

Consider Afghanistan. Which was the helicopter of choice for combat operations in the most inhospitable terrain? The CH-47 Chinook. Big, noisy, slow, less manoeuvrable – but with high power-to-weight ratio, often an excess of power and a heavy payload, especially logistically. These could be traded-off to provide, still, an excellent balance of capabilities. Smaller medium support helicopters undertaking the same trade-offs end up with payloads that render their use almost worthless.

Can one have a helicopter which has too much internal fuel, too much power, too great a payload? Why operate two dozen aircraft carrying a dozen men each when you can fly two dozen that take 30-50 each? The only exception to the payload/power rule might well be the V-22 Osprey. As Defence Analysis has previously commented on Afghanistan, the range problems there were those that played into the hands of the Osprey lobby and they might yet prove to be the same with Iraq.

SEA PRE-POSITIONING

OK, major bases and logistics facilities in Saudi Arabia look certain to be out of bounds. Sure, Qatar might make a nice base. But as mentioned earlier, Doha to the southern tip of Iraq is still 500-600km – UAE and Oman (if facilities there are available) are further away still. The importance of sea positioning of equipment will be reinforced, as it was with Afghanistan.

It is paradoxical that for land-locked Afghanistan the key was aircraft carriers and marines aboard assault ships that provided much of the combat power. And the same looks possibly true of an attack on Iraq. The ability to stay in international waters with a major slice of combat power, deploying it as and when necessary, shows once again the flexibility of amphibious forces. The ability to act as a military tortoise or snail – carrying everything on one's back – is demonstrating itself a winner in expeditionary warfare.

BRIDGING EQUIPMENT

Just a casual glance at the geography of southern Iraq should remind one that this is a riverine-dominated area. Even with the drainage of swamps to deny cover to the Marsh Arabs, the dominance of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in this area is absolute. Hence any advance through this area will be dictated to a greater or lesser extent by the rivers, their tributaries and any flood plains.

Bridges were heavily targeted during the 1991 Gulf War, and although many have been repaired others have not. On this basis alone, anyone looking to undertake an advance through the key areas of south Iraq ought to have a weather eye on his bridging train. The last thing anyone needs is to come to a river yet be unable to cross it.

Of course, some would say that with the availability of support helicopters rivers play a lesser role in determining the battlefield – troops can just be flown over the waters. But when re-supply and sustainment are considered, then only the brave or the foolish believe that support of a major helicopter fleet can be undertaken solely by air – fuel bowsers and trucks can deliver many times the amount of aviation fuel as air transport.

FIBUA/MOUT

Are people really ready for the possibility of fighting in built-up areas? Are they aware of the demands on ammunition supply that these operations make? If the areas still have civilians, what measures will be taken to minimise civilian casualties? After all, the ultimate aim of the operation will be to overthrow the Iraqi regime, not to kill innocent Iraqis who might be unable to do anything about their predicament.

Just how well-prepared are the US forces – especially – to undertake what historically has been one of the toughest and bloodiest military missions? Examples of FIBUA from Israeli military missions in the Occupied Territories show quite how bloody things can get. But they also show how worldwide concern builds up when 'over-excessive' means are used – bulldozers, firing white phosphorous into buildings and so forth – when civilians are still present.

• UK Equipment Trade-Offs - THE FIRST SIGN OF FRAILTY?
• UK Procurement System - NO FLEXIBILITY?
• Helicopter Performance - GROWING OLD GRACEFULLY?
• SDR: Next Steps Budgets - MATCHING RESOURCES TO NEEDS
• National Audit Office Saif Sareea Report- MUCH TO THINK ABOUT
• UK Equipment Budget - SPENDING MONEY WISELY
• Government Accounting: Saif Sareea II - SETTING STANDARDS
• UK Electric Armour Programme - A BRAVE NEW WORLD?
• Gulf Defence Procurement - THE QUITE OF THE SATED?
• Trainer Aircraft Market - THE PURSUIT OF SALES
• Iraq Attack Planning - BEEN THERE BEFORE
• Naval Damage Control - NUMBERS EQUAL SAFETY
• Fighter Aircraft Companies - CRUISING FOR A BRUISING?
• Alvis Purchase of Vickers Defence Systems - A BRAVE NEW WORLD?
• Future Infantry Soldier Technology Programme and UK Primes - PRIME REAL ESTATE BATTLE
• DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWS
• DEFENCE DIVERSITY

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